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Abstract
Establishing the Digital Chain of Evidence in Biometric Systems
Nick Bartlow
Traditionally, a chain of evidence or chain of custody refers to the chronological doc-
umentation, or paper trail, showing the seizure, custody, control, transfer, analysis, and
disposition of evidence, physical or electronic. Whether in the criminal justice system, mil-
itary applications, or natural disasters, ensuring the accuracy and integrity of such chains
is of paramount importance. Intentional or unintentional alteration, tampering, or fabrica-
tion of digital evidence can lead to undesirable effects. We find despite the consequences at
stake, historically, no unique protocol or standardized procedure exists for establishing such
chains. Current practices rely on traditional paper trails and handwritten signatures as the
foundation of chains of evidence.
Copying, fabricating or deleting electronic data is easier than ever and establishing equiv-
alent digital chains of evidence has become both necessary and desirable. We propose to
consider a chain of digital evidence as a multi-component validation problem. It ensures
the security of access control, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of origin. Our
framework, includes techniques from cryptography, keystroke analysis, digital watermark-
ing, and hardware source identification. The work offers contributions to many of the fields
used in the formation of the framework. Related to biometric watermarking, we provide a
means for watermarking iris images without significantly impacting biometric performance.
Specific to hardware fingerprinting, we establish the ability to verify the source of an image
captured by biometric sensing devices such as fingerprint sensors and iris cameras. Related
to keystroke dynamics, we establish that user stimulus familiarity is a driver of classification
performance. Finally, example applications of the framework are demonstrated with data
collected in crime scene investigations, people screening activities at port of entries, naval
maritime interdiction operations, and mass fatality incident disaster responses.
This work is dedicated to my family for their unwavering support, encouragement, and
understanding
And to my fiance´e Kellyn, for putting up with me during the “double shifts” over the long
haul
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Traditionally, a chain of evidence or chain of custody refers to the chronological documenta-
tion, or paper trail, showing the seizure, custody, control, transfer, analysis, and disposition
of evidence, physical or electronic [142]. Whether in law enforcement, homeland security,
or military operations, ensuring the accuracy and integrity of such chains is of paramount
importance. Intentional or unintentional alteration, tampering, or fabrication of evidence
in such arenas can lead to undesirable effects. In law enforcement and certain homeland
security operations, the chain of evidence must establish, according to the requirements of
the criminal justice system, that alleged evidence is indeed related to the crime in question
as opposed to having been planted fraudulently. In military operations, identification of
enemy combatants is critical to the success of operational objectives and such identifications
must be verifiable and logged accordingly to justify various courses of action. In homeland
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security operations such as responding to natural disasters, the process of documenting the
identity of victims to be passed on to family members must be checked and rechecked to pre-
vent dispersal of erroneous information. Regardless of the application, there is typically an
underlying theme of identifying individuals, which naturally entails biometric data. Exam-
ples of such biometric data might include face, fingerprint, or iris images. While traditional
standards require the creation of a trail of paper documentation, creation and enforcement
of electronic equivalents of such trails is now possible. Besides facilitating more efficient
transmission and storage, adaptation of electronic chains of evidence can potentially offer a
greater capacity to verify evidence, especially when applied to biometric data. Development
of such a framework is an essential starting point for organizations that wish to enhance, or
replace currently existing paper based evidence chains and develop a means to establish and
maintain digital chains of evidence.
1.2 Goal
Creating a verifiable digital chain of evidence simplifies to a multi-component validation
problem. At any given point in time, an individual should be able to validate the content,
transmission, and source of evidence. Content validation refers to whether evidence was in-
appropriately modified at one entity in the chain before being transmitted to another entity.
Transmission validation deals with whether evidence was inappropriately modified during
the transmission from one entity to the next. Finally, source validation ensures that data
originated from the source in which it was claimed to originate from. The goal of this work
is to develop a conceptual framework for creating a digital chain of evidence which allows
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for validation at the three aforementioned levels. To do so, we first investigate and de-
velop topics which can be employed as security mechanisms within the framework including:
biometric watermarking, digital hardware fingerprinting, and the behavioral biometric of
keystroke dynamics. Next we develop the framework which relies upon these three security
mechanisms and cryptography. Specifically, we use cryptography to handle security threats
of data interception, data modification, data fabrication, repudiation of origin, and denial of
receipt. Biometric watermarking is applied to add another layer of protection against data
interception, data modification, data fabrication, and repudiation of origin. Keystroke dy-
namics (or any other biometric) is used to prevent unauthorized user access. Finally, digital
hardware fingerprinting is also used to prevent data modification and data fabrication.
1.3 Contributions
This work provides the following set of original contributions:
1. Development of an iris digital watermarking system which is not only resistant to
common application scenarios such at database compression and partial progressive
decoding, but also capable of withstanding the rewatermarking process which might
be seen in the proposed chain of evidence. Our work extends current biometric water-
marking techniques by modifying existing approaches to allow for selective encoding
in the region of interest in iris biometric images. Additionally, our approach provides
a novel asymmetric implementation of the watermarking scheme.
2. Demonstration of the ability to perform source validation on biometric modalities which
collect data with capture devices outside of typical photographic cameras. We apply an
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approach designed for digital cameras to a series of biometric fingerprint readers as well
as iris cameras using sensors which respond to the infrared band of the electromagnetic
spectrum.
3. Demonstration that input stimulus familiarity is a driver of classification performance
in keystroke dynamic systems.
4. Development of a conceptual framework for establishing and maintaining digital chain
of evidence dealing with biometric data which relies on elements of cryptography,
biometric watermarking, digital hardware fingerprinting, and biometrics. This also
includes the process of vetting the framework against security threats related to confi-
dentiality and integrity. Finally, we include an example instantiation of the conceptual
framework using specific examples from each of the security mechanisms upon which
framework relies.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a summary
of related work regarding traditional evidence chains, biometric watermarking, hardware
fingerprinting, and keystroke dynamics. Chapters 3-5 describe specific contributions in the
areas of iris digital watermarking, digital hardware fingerprinting, and keystroke dynamics.
Chapter 6 describes the proposed conceptual framework for establishing and maintaining
digital chains of evidence. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the work by providing a summary
of the accomplishments as well as future directions for research.
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter provides a summary of the related work in the fundamental areas of research
relevant to this effort. The fields of interest include traditional evidence chain systems,
biometric watermarking, digital hardware fingerprinting, and keystroke dynamics. While no
summary can be complete, each subsection attempts to offer sufficient breadth and depth to
provide the reader with a basic working knowledge of the field.
2.1 Chain of Evidence
2.1.1 Introduction
According to Breitman, a “chain of custody”, synonymous with a “chain of evidence” in our
work, refers to the to “the history of a piece of physical evidence after it has been identified
and preserved” [21]. Another definition is offered by Wikipedia, “Chain of custody refers to
the chronological documentation, and/or paper trail, showing the seizure, custody, control,
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transfer, analysis, and disposition of evidence, physical or electronic.” Most commonly found
in criminal justice systems, a chain of evidence serves two primary purposes as defined by
McCormick’s “On Evidence” [31], “First, it identifies the object being offered, to establish
that it is in fact the object that caused or contributed to the plaintiffs injury. This is
described as “authentication.” The second purpose is to establish that the condition of
the object is substantially the same as when the injury occurred”. While these services
are specifically aimed at criminal justice applications, they need only be altered slightly
to generalize to any application which deals with physical or electronic evidence. Perhaps
such a generalization can be found in the term “evidence management” defined as “the
administration and control of evidence related to an event so that it can be used to prove
the circumstances of the event, and so that this proof can be tested by independent parties
with confidence that the evidence provided is the evidence collected related to the event”
[143]. Whether in the criminal justice system, military operations, or other arenas, this
documentation and management of evidence is a critical component to ensure the proper
course of actions are taken in the systems which it supports.
2.1.2 Traditional Paper Based Chains
As mentioned in the introduction, traditionally, chains of evidence have been tied to the
criminal justice systems. Given the consequences, one might think there would be a widely
accepted protocol for establishing a chain of evidence or chain of custody. We find however,
historically, no unique protocol or standardized procedure exists. Breitman states that “Un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence, that standard of proof requires only that the party offering
an item of physical evidence introduces such proof as is “sufficient to support” a finding that
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the [item in question] is what its proponent claims: Federal Rule of Evidence, 901(a)” [21]
[58]. Additionally, he points out that “the ultimate issues of authentication and condition
are left for the jury. If the proponent’s evidence is facially sufficient to support a finding
of authenticity, then all other issues such as credibility and probability are left for the jury
[21].” Taking these accounts into consideration, the onus of establishing a burden of proof in
a criminal justice system falls on many shoulders. At the highest level, it is the responsibility
of prosecutors and defense attorneys. At the lowest level, it is the responsibility of officers,
lab technicians, evidence clerks and all other individuals supporting local, state, and fed-
eral law enforcement activities. As one might suspect, this lack of a prescribed method for
establishing an evidentiary chain of custody results in great variability in terms of what pro-
cedures and protocols are practiced and observed at the various levels of law enforcement and
prosecution. Naturally, documenting information about evidence such as item descriptions,
date of receipts, case numbers, the name of the officer providing the evidence, and inventory
numbers provide the foundation for establishing such a chain [38]. However, information of
this nature does not encompass even minimal requirements to remove “reasonable doubt”
that evidence is original, and not been intentionally or unintentionally tampered with or
planted. The reader can probably recall several high profile cases when “smoking gun” type
evidence was presented but the failure to properly administer or present the chain of custody
rendered the evidence either inadmissable or not valid in the eyes of the jury. While one
may assume most agencies have internal protocols for establishing chains of evidence, few
agencies have public documentation of such protocols. Perhaps the most inclusive publicly
available record is provided by the Minnesota Department of Corrections [14]. Their “Ev-
idence Handling” policy describes the procedures for the collection, preservation, storage,
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and disposal of various forms of physical evidence.
2.1.3 Digital Chains of Evidence
As can be seen in the previous section, there are enormous challenges that stand in the way
of developing standardized protocols for establishing a chain of physical evidence. Given
the current state of technology, copying, fabricating, and deleting electronic data is easier
than ever, and establishing a digital equivalent of a chain of evidence involves even more
challenges. Additionally, due to the lack of standardization in traditional chains, we are
provided with no “template” in which to base a foundation for a digital chain of evidence.
Consistent with traditional chains of evidence, we see that the burden of proof once again
falls on the presenter when dealing with electronic evidence. Berg states, “Chain of custody
can be one of the most difficult issues faced by the forensic professional trying to introduce a
digital image as evidence in a criminal case. If a defendant alleges an image has been altered,
or could have been altered, the burden of proof falls upon the state to prove otherwise. If the
image is a fingerprint linking the defendant to a crime scene, it is inevitable that the defense
attorney will raise a question about the integrity of the image. In many cases, the success
of the argument will hinge upon the procedures used to safeguard the security of the images
[15].” Fortunately, if applied appropriately, existing technologies can potentially offer more
efficient and accurate means to transmit, authenticate, and present electronic evidence.
Despite the need and potential advantages of developing such digital equivalents, it is
apparent that little effort has been documented toward this end. Perhaps the most inclusive
attempts at formalizing a digital chain of evidences are presented by Duerr et. al in [37] and
Francoeur in [42]. Duerr’s work proposes an information assurance approach to authenticat-
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ing digital evidence. To that regard, it attempts to meet the five primary security services
of access control, confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation. While the work
provides a high level overview of some of the problems associated with the task, it provides
little detailed descriptions of how to actually go about providing these services. The main
component it does touch on is integrity, explaining various aspects of traditional PKI and
digital signatures. Francoeur’s work focuses on the difficulties associated with establishing
an electronic equivalent to a handwritten signature. Figure 2.1 shows his seven component
diagram of a digital chain of evidence which touches on a number of aspects relevant to
the proposed work. The work also provides useful information regarding the U.S. e-Sign
Act which in part ensures that no signature or record will be deemed inadmissable in courts
merely because of its electronic form. Additionally, it also provides information regarding the
challenges associated with denial of signatures and the sequence in which a digital signature
should be created. Similar to Duerr’s work, we unfortunately see that while outlining many
services a digital chain of evidence should provide, it does little to describe the mechanisms
for actually providing them. Finally, while mentioning some of the challenges associated
with including techniques such as watermarking in digital chains of evidence, Berg’s work
does not address frameworks, implementation details, or methods of performing the various
aspects of validation to authenticate digital evidence. He does however, conclude his work
with the passage “In the end, when an image is introduced in court, the first question that
will need to be answered remains, “Is this image a fair and accurate representation of the
scene or object as it was found?” Questions about chain of custody or the validity of specific
computer enhancement techniques will ultimately be answered in accordance with the rec-
ognized scientific principles of the day.” The proposed approaches and techniques presented
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Figure 2.1: Francouer’s Digital Chain of Evidence [42].
in the remaining chapters should help to define the “recognized scientific principles of the
day.”
2.2 Biometric Watermarking
Biometric watermarking is a specialized version of digital watermarking which typically
involves imperceptibly embedding data in raw biometric host media for the purpose of pro-
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viding additional security to a biometric system. Watermarks can range from non-biometric
strings of random digits to system specific identifiers such as organization names and file
creation dates to feature vectors from biometrics different than the host data. The addi-
tional security gained may result from using the watermark as a mechanism for proving file
authenticity, tracking chain of custody and data reproduction, or to afford a multimodal
biometric option. Biometric watermarking is typically used in tandem with cryptography
and importantly provides a layer of security which remains intact after the decryption pro-
cess. A biometric watermarking system should operate without significantly degrading the
performance of the host biometric system it protects.
2.2.1 Introduction
First coined by Tirkel et. al [130], the term “digital watermark” originated in 1993. Unlike
their physical predecessors (i.e. currency, copyright marks, etc.), digital watermarks are
usually imperceptible to the human eye and require the use of machines to be detected in
and extracted from the host media in which they are embedded. Although separate, digital
watermarking is closely related to the field of steganography where secret messages are clan-
destinely embedded in larger, unrelated messages. Traditionally, digital watermarking has
been employed as a means of copyright protection which allows an individual to prove (or
disprove) ownership by embedding and extracting data suitable for verification of ownership.
Additionally, digital watermarking can be applied to verify the authenticity of media, pro-
vide copy protection or reproduction management, and offer another mechanism for content
description [149, 8]. Biometric watermarking is a specialized version of digital watermark-
ing with the most noticeable difference being either the content of the watermark, the host
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data, or both. Figure 2.2 shows examples of the four main classes of digital watermarking
as they relate to biometric watermarking. Although cases (a) and (c) are perhaps most
popular where biometric data serves as the host, case (b) can also be considered biometric
watermarking when biometric data is embedded in non-biometric host data.
34.67 23.40 80.12   
20.12 30.45 90.73…
110001000000000000
000000000000001110
10000000000000000…
(a) Voice Cepstral analysis feature
vector embedded in an iris image.
0.2726  0.4427
-0.8443  0.1290…
000011000000000000
000000000000000111
01000000000000000…
(b) Principal components from face
image embedded in baboon image.
Creation Date : 01.01.09
067 114 101 097 
116 105 111 110…
110000100000000000
000000000000000100
11100000000000000…
(c) Image creation date embedded
in fingerprint image.
Copyright West Virginia 
University 2008
067 111 112 121
114 105 103 104…
110000100000000000
000000000000001111
01100000000000000…
(d) Copyright information embed-
ded in Lena image.
Figure 2.2: The four classes of digital watermarking (a) Biometric watermark embedded in biomet-
ric host data (b) Biometric watermark embedded in non-biometric host data (c) Non-biometric wa-
termark embedded in biometric host data (d) Non-biometric watermark embedded in non-biometric
host data. Cases (a)-(c) represent biometric watermarking
. The images of Lena and the baboon are reproduced from the USC-SIPI Image Database
Besides the four main classes of watermarking, there are many types of biometric water-
marking with differentiations in three main categories (visibility, blindess, and symmetry) as
outlined in Table 2.1. The issue of visibility or perceptibility relates to whether or not the
watermark is noticeable by humans either visually or audibly depending on the nature of the
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Type Description
Visible
The embedded information is noticeable by humans, either
visually in pictures, or audibly in sound files.
Invisible
The embedded information is either completely impercep-
tible or not immediately noticeable by humans lacking the
assistance of machines.
Public (blind)
The original host file is not required to detect / extract the
embedded watermark.
Semi-blind
The embedded watermark is detected with additional infor-
mation relative to the watermark encoding scheme but does
not require the entire original host file.
Private (non-blind)
The embedded watermark can only be detected / extracted
with both the watermarked image and the original host file.
Symmetric (Private Key)
A secret / private key is utilized to encode the watermark in
the host image. This requires communication of the secret
key between the sender and receiver.
Asymmetric (Public Key)
A public-private key pair are used to encode the watermark
in the host file. The use of a public key pair prevents the need
to communicate a secret key between sender and receiver as
only the public portions of the key pairs need to be available.
Optionally, this method can ensure image integrity and non
repudiation of origin..
Table 2.1: Description of digital watermarking types applicable to biometric watermarking.
host data. The detection and extraction processes may or may not rely on the original host
data or auxiliary data to complete, this notion is referred to as blindness. Finally, water-
marking systems must make use of keys, either private, similar to symmetric cryptographic
systems or public key pairs akin to asymmetric cryptosystems. A biometric watermarking
system encompassing any combination these categories is imaginable but an invisible, blind,
and asymmetric system is arguably the most difficult to conceive.
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Beyond the scope of classes and categories, the quality of a biometric watermarking sys-
tem can be evaluated by five types of characteristics: imperceptibility, robustness, fragility,
capacity, and performability. Table 2.2 describes each of these five characteristics in depth.
Although the characteristics of imperceptibility, robustness, fragility, and capacity will gen-
eralize to to digital watermarking, the characteristic of performability is specific to biometric
watermarking.
2.2.2 Algorithms
Digital and biometric watermarking algorithms both operate on a similar framework which
can be generalized into three operating modules, namely, an encoding, decoding, and authen-
tication. Figure 3.1 outlines these modules, providing a generalization of the watermarking
framework for both digital and biometric watermarking. The first operating module, the
watermark encoder, embeds the watermark into the host data. The watermark can range
from a random binary bit sequence to biometric eigen-face coefficients utilized for face recog-
nition. Additionally, the encoding module may also utilize an embedding key / secret key
which discerns specific embedding locations in the host data to be watermarked. The second
operating module, the watermark decoder, takes as input the watermarked host data and
processes it in order to extract the watermark. If an embedding key / secret key was used
during the encoding module then the same key is required for the decoding process. Addi-
tionally, depending on the algorithm, original host data may also be required to extract the
watermark. The last module, authentication, compares the recovered watermark to the orig-
inal indicating the similarity between the two. In the event that the watermark is biometric
in nature, the biometric data can optionally be passed on to its authentication system.
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Characteristic Description
Imperceptibility
The degree in which the host image is visibly altered or distorted
due to the presence of the watermark. Watermarked images that
bear no visible difference from their original host image are said
to be imperceptible. Rarely, this characteristic may be evaluated
beyond the scope of human perception. In these cases, the question
is raised as to whether or not it is possible to reveal that an image
contains a watermark through the aid of a machine or program
(without access to the original host image).
Robustness
The ability of the watermark to be detected and extracted after the
watermarked image has been subjected to any variety of transfor-
mations (i.e. compression, filters, affine transformations).
Fragility
The ability to detect any file transformation by way of the water-
mark. The detection might result from an inability to extract the
watermark or from an extracted watermark that in not intact.
Capacity
The amount of information which can be embedded in the host data
of a watermarking system. This is a function of the type and size of
the host data that is being watermarked and the robustness of the
watermarking system in terms of detectability and extractability.
Performability
The degree in which the watermark affects the performance of the
biometric system(s) in question. At a minimum, biometric water-
marking systems should not have a significant adverse affect on the
performance of the biometric system(s) which they protect. Here
performance can entail matching error rates, image quality, effi-
ciency of computation time, etc. Some biometric watermarking
schemes may positively affect biometric system performance.
Table 2.2: Characteristics of biometric watermarking systems
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Figure 2.3: Generalized block diagram of a watermarking process. Shaded blocks indicate the
main watermarking modules while dashed blocks / lines indicate optional areas of processing which
are algorithm specific.
Watermark embedding and decoding techniques fall into two categories: spatial and
transform domain techniques. Each category has specific advantages and disadvantages but
in general spatial domain techniques are of lower complexity and more robust to biometric
replacement attacks while transform domain techniques are of higher complexity but in ad-
dition are more robust to geometrical attacks such as rotation, scaling, and translation. In
[63], an extension of the spatial domain watermarking technique known as amplitude mod-
ulation is utilized to hide a face image inside a fingerprint image. Eigen-face coefficients are
watermarked into a fingerprint image at locations specified by a secret key. After decoding,
both the reconstructed fingerprint and the face image are used for validation. They verify
their experiments by demonstrating that the matching performance of the reconstructed fin-
gerprint images is virtually unaffected by their watermarking system. Low et. al. in [85] ,
watermark a non-biometric host image with off-line handwritten signature in the form of a
discretized bit string. They experiment and evaluate with three watermarking techniques:
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least signification bit (LSB), CDMA spread spectrum in spatial, and CMDA spread spec-
trum in a transform domain such as discrete wavelet (DWT). Their experiments show that
CMDA in the wavelet domain provides the most conclusive results with respect to jpeg com-
pression and image quality. Similarly, Noore et. al. [102], utilize the DWT to watermark
fingerprint images with face and demographic text data. They validate their experiments
by illustrating that the matching performance of the watermarked fingerprint is unaffected
by the watermark and demonstrate that their watermarking system is tolerant to various
degradations such as cropping rotation, jpeg compression, noise, and median filtering.
2.2.3 Application Scenarios and Attacks
Depending on the intended use, biometric watermarking systems are subject to a series
of application scenarios and attacks. Application scenarios can be thought of as normal
usage patterns that a watermarking system should realistically be expected to withstand
without serious side effects on the performance of any of the characteristics outlined in
Table 2.2. Examples of application scenarios can include, but are not limited to: database
(re)compression, partial progressive decoding, and noisy channel transmission. Each of these
scenarios can have an effect on one or more characteristics of a biometric watermarking
system. For instance, a highly compressed watermarked image may lead to difficulties in the
watermark extraction process as a compression algorithm often significantly alters an image,
which in turn alters the watermark itself. Occasionally operational environments result in
slow data transmission speeds which may force a system to progressively decode portions
of an image as it becomes available. This type of application scenario can have an effect
on the robustness of the extraction process, the performance of the biometric system(s) in
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question, and potentially the imperceptibility of the watermark. Many techniques are capable
of tolerating scenarios similar to these. That said, the expected application environment
should be considered when attempting to appropriately choose a watermarking technique
as the current state of the technology finds a given technique may be well suited for one
application scenario but not perform well in another
Perhaps the most notable difference between the general field of digital watermarking
and biometric watermarking is its relationship to the characteristic of performability. For
obvious reasons, a biometric watermarking system must minimize the effect it has on the
biometric system it protects. Issues such as matching performance, image quality, compu-
tational efficiency, and even legal repercussions must not be ignored. Regarding matching
performance, a biometric watermarking system should not impede the main block of the
biometric system(s) in question, specifically the feature extraction and matching blocks. It
should be noted that this effect could potentially propagate itself in two ways. Perhaps the
most obvious effect is when the host data is used in a biometric system; here the presence of
the watermark may impede the feature extraction process as the watermark may add noise
to the image. Naturally this may lead to inaccuracies in the matching block. A less obvious
effect is when a biometric feature vector serves as a watermark and is also used as part
of a biometric system. In this scenario, accurate extraction of the watermark is of utmost
importance as small changes in the values of feature vectors can lead to significant changes
in authentication results. Little or no work exists studying the latter of the two effects.
Application scenarios aside, biometric watermarking systems must also deal with attacks
or malicious attempts to subvert a system. Such attacks may involve removal, alteration, or
replacement of the embedded watermark found in an image. Although some of these may
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also fall in the application scenario domain, examples of attacks include: rotation, scaling,
translation, cropping, masking, and (re)watermarking. Similar to application scenarios, dif-
ferent biometric watermarking techniques can handle different attacks with varying degrees
of success. Although not specific to biometric watermarking, Zheng et. al provide an ex-
cellent breakdown of so-called RST (rotation, scaling, translation) invariant watermarking
algorithms in [149]. Often the ability to handle a given attack lies in the domain in which a
biometric watermarking technique operates. For instance, rotation attacks are handled with
greater ease by watermarking techniques which operate in tranform domains (i.e. Fourier,
DCT, wavelet, etc.) This type of attack is arguably more difficult to handle in techniques
that fall in the spatial domain. Conversely, the spatial domain is more akin to dealing with
a biometric replacement attacks (i.e. replacing the watermarked iris or face region of an
image) as the biometric ROI is known in the spatial domain but more difficult to localize
in a transform domain. Little work has been done addressing attacks specific to biomet-
ric watermarking systems; most work focuses only on attacks to the general area of digital
watermarking but it should be noted that many such specific attacks exist.
2.2.4 Patents, Tools, and Commercial Products
Searching the United States Patent Office for “Biometric Watermarking” yields well over 100
entries of varying relevance to the field. The most notable is entitled “Biometric Watermarks”
and was issued in 2001 to GTE Service Corporation [98]. This patent outlines the general
schematic for a biometric watermarking system. A more recent patent can be found in
USPO 7,305,089 issued to Canon in 2007 which includes an watermarking system embedded
in a camera with the intended purpose of associating a photographers biometric information
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with images taken by the camera [96]. At least two freely available tools related to digital
watermarking and biometric watermarking exist. Stirmark Benchmark 4.0 is a software tool
designed to perform robustness testing of image watermarking algorithms [113]. Checkmark
also provides a bed of attacks to evaluate the robustness of a watermarking system [111].
Many commercial entities offer a broad range of digital watermarking solutions that can
potentially fall under the category of biometric watermarking. Perhaps the most widely
known of such companies is DigiMarc Corporation based Oregon, US.
2.3 Digital Hardware Fingerprinting
Falling within the field of image forensics, digital hardware fingerprinting is the process
of identifying the source hardware used to capture an image. More often than not, this
identification process is independent of the scenery or primary image content but rather based
on some other feature of the image. Such a process is has a number of applications including
verifying authenticity and integrity of images, enforcing copyright protection, establishing
ownership of data, tracing the origin of data, and establishing a chain of evidence in criminal
cases or other arenas.
2.3.1 Introduction
Digital hardware fingerprinting deals with the investigation of techniques used to identify
the unique characteristics of devices that capture images (e.g., digital cameras, camcorders,
and scanners, biometric devices, etc.) [121]. These unique characteristics can then be used
to identify the source used to capture an image which can then be subsequently used to
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verify image authenticity, integrity, etc. In this sense, “source” can encompass any number
of ideas. Take for instance the most commonly used example of digital photography, here
the “source” is a camera and the hardware fingerprinting system is attempting to identify
which camera captured the image. In this simple example “source” identification can take
place at four different levels. Figure 2.4 shows four levels that may be considered in a source
hardware identification problem: technology, brand, model, and unit. Based on the four
Technology1.
Brand
Model
2.
Unit
3.
4.
Figure 2.4: Source Hardware Identification Levels.
levels, various questions can be answered:
• Was the image in question captured from a sensor relying on technology X or technology
Y? (Technology)
• Was the image in question captured from a device manufactured by vendor X or vendor
Y? (Brand)
• Was the image in question captured from a device corresponding to model X or model
Y manufactured by vendor Z? (Model)
• Was the image in question captured from a unit A or unit B of model X manufactured
by vendor Z? (Unit)
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Naturally, unique challenges exist to performing source model identification at the different
levels. Furthermore, the choice of which feature to use may be in part dependent on the level
at which a system must operate. The overwhelming majority of research on digital image
forensics deals specifically with images captured from photographic cameras and document
scanners.
2.3.2 Features and Classification Techniques
There are many proposed approaches to performing source hardware identification at dif-
ferent levels that are well summarized in a surveys of the field by Sencar et. al in [121]
and Khanna et al. in [72]. To facilitate a better understanding of the different approaches,
this section is broken down at a high level based on the features used for classification as is
presented in [121].
CFA and Demosaicing Artifacts
The most sensors found in digital cameras are based on concept of a Color Filter Array
(CFA) composed of a surface of pixels that each have their own spectrally sensitive filter [6].
Depending on the choice of CFA, an appropriate demosaicing algorithm must be chosen to
correctly render high spatial frequency image details [121]. These demosaicing algorithms
introduce an interpolation effect which produces unique correlations between color values of
image pixels. These correlations, or demosaicing artifacts, can in turn be used to identify
source camera models [121]. Approaches utilizing these artifacts have been proposed with
varying success by Popescu [115], Bayram et. al [13], Long et. al. [84], and Swaminathan
et. al. [127] with the highest classification accuracy of 95% on four camera models achieved
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by Long et. al’s PCA based approach.
Lens Distortions
Lens distortions result from changing image magnification which in turn changes the distance
from the optical axis [121]. Choi et al. proposed an approach based on lens distortions to
distinguish between three camera models in [28]. This work uses various parameters from
algorithms that attempt to compensate for such distortions as features for identification. The
proposed approach involving a radial symmetric distortion model achieves a 91% accuracy.
Sensor Dust Characteristics
Although not inherent to the capture devices, the notion of sensor dust characteristics has
been explored by Dirik et al. in [35]. In the work, the authors examine digital single-
lens reflex (DSLR) cameras which typically acquire dust occluding the sensor when lens are
changed. The approach uses a technique based on match filtering and contour analysis [121].
While the experimental results claim an accuracy of 92% in correctly identifying a single
camera’s images from a bed of images taken from other cameras, the approach may run into
challenges as cameras increasingly embed corrective algorithms to compensate for dust [121].
Imaging Sensor Imperfections
Arguably the most attractive approaches to camera source identification are based on imaging
sensor imperfections. Due to small imperfections in the manufacturing process, whether from
the presence of hot or cold pixels or pattern noise, each sensor typically has a unique signature
which manifests itself in all images it captures. Geradts et al. proposed a technique based
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on the presence of dead pixels in [46]. Perhaps the most promising approach to date was
proposed by Lukas et al. in [86]. Based on measuring pixel nonuniformity (PNU) noise, the
approach analyzes the differences in images resulting from imaging sensor imperfections [86].
This approach uses a wavelet denoising algorithm to model the photo-response nonuniformity
(PRNU) component of the PNU which in turn serves as a reference template for each camera.
Then, a correlation algorithm is used to match the noise patterns from images to be identified
to the reference templates. The approach achieves 100% accuracy on a 9 camera set which
does include some duplicate instances of camera models. Sutcu et. al [126] tested the
technique on a larger database of images arriving at more realistic (< 100%) performance
rates. Fridrich et. al extends the approach in [26] by applying preprocessing techniques
to the noise extraction algorithm. Finally, Khanna et. al [70], and Guo et. al [49] also
proposed approaches using sensor pattern noise to fingerprint flatbed scanners instead of
digital cameras.
Not falling specifically in any of the four previously mentioned groups is a somewhat
general approach proposed by Kharrazi et al. which outlines 34 image features including
average pixel values, RGB pair correlations, and neighbor distribution center of mass [73].
The features are then input into multi-class classifiers and achieve an accuracy of 97% on a
four camera database.
2.4 Keystroke Dynamics
Keystroke recognition is a behavioral biometric which utilizes the unique manner in which
a person types to verify the identity of an individual. Typing patterns are predominantly
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extracted from computer keyboards, but the information can potentially be gathered from
any input device having traditional keys with tactile response (i.e. cellular phones, PDA’s,
etc). Although other measurements are conceivable, patterns used in keystroke dynamics are
derived mainly from the two events that make up a keystroke: the Key-Down and Key-Up.
The Key-Down event takes place at the initial depression of a key and the Key-Up occurs at
the subsequent release of that key. Various unique features are then calculated based on the
intra-key and inter-key timing variations between these events. After feature extraction, a
wide range of algorithms can be employed to establish whether the unique pattern confirms
or denies the claimed identity.
2.4.1 Introduction
The earliest form of keystroke recognition emerged in the early 1900s during the days of WWI.
During the war, the French used listening posts in which operators were able to recognize
the “fist” of enemy radio operators communicating in Morse code. These trained individuals
would learn to recognize operators by differing lengths of pauses, dots and slashes, and vary-
ing transmission speeds. This intelligence subsequently allowed the French to establish the
identity of entities such as enemy battalions. Far more sophisticated than electromechanical
telegraphs used to transmit Morse code, keyboards of today offer many more opportunities
to establish the unique manner in which one types. Intuitively, coarse level differentiation
can be achieved by investigating typing speeds. For instance, a professional typist who av-
erages 90 or more words per minute would be easily distinguished from a “hunt and peck”
amateur who averages only 20-25 words per minute. That said, this feature only goes so far
as many people type at similar speeds and the average speed that an individual types can
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vary significantly depending on many factors. The time it takes an individual to locate a key
(sometimes referred to as “seek-time”) also varies from key to key. For instance, left-handed
individuals may have quicker seek-times for keys on the left side of the keyboard and vice
versa [95]. Along those same lines, use of the shift keys to modify characters can also vary
from individual based on handedness and typing skill. Trained professionals will always mod-
ify characters on the right side of the keyboard with the left shift key while amateurs may
continually use the right shift key to do so [12]. Language undoubtedly plays a large role in
the individuality of a typing signature. Given that a person speaks English, commonly used
words like {the, and, you, are} are often “programmed” in one’s mind and typed quickly as
opposed to an individual of a different native language. Additionally, individuals typically
exhibit a consistent pattern of errors including replacements, reversals, and extraneous hits.
In an extreme case, the consistent lack of errors is a pattern in itself.
2.4.2 Keyboard Technology and Semantics
There are four different kinds of switch technology used in keyboards today; pure mechanical,
foam element, rubber dome, and membrane [97]. Each switch type has various characteristics
such as feel, durability, price, etc. No matter the key switch technology chosen, when a key
is depressed, a degree of “bounce” is present. Bounce can be defined as the effect when
the contact device rapidly engages and disengages over an extremely short period of time
[97]. Keyboards, either external to desktop PCs or internal to laptops and other devices
are computers in their own right as they contain a microprocessor, RAM, and sometimes
ROM. Using their processors and controllers, they filter out the difference between bounce
and two successive keystrokes. Each stroke therefore consists of two events, when the plates
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are engaged and when the engagement is released or disengaged. Scan codes resulting from
these events are sent from the controller in the keyboard to the event handler in the BIOS of
the device in question (usually a PC) [97]. Scan codes are recorded by the processor based
on a matrix composed of all the keys on the keyboard. The keyboard matrix operates on a
buffer that allows for the processing of simultaneous keystroke events. As mentioned before,
when a key is pressed down, the plates become engaged. It is at this point that the keyboard
processor sends a “make code” encoded as a hex value to the device. The make code can
be thought of as including both the key engaged and various other state flags indicating if
/ how the key was modified by any of the various control keys such as shift, alt, etc. Once
the key disengages, a corresponding “break code” is sent to the PC [97]. These ideas form
the basis of keyboard technology at its lowest-level.
Using this background as a foundation, the upper level semantics of keyboard operation
can be defined. The basis of all features included in keystroke recognition is founded on the
keystroke event and the associated make code / break code correlation described previously.
Instead of dealing with terms like “make code,” “disengagement,” etc., researchers usually
yield to the more intuitive, higher level definitions below.
1. Key-Down- The event that fires when a key is pressed down. This corresponds to
the event of the keyboard processor sending the device (usually a PC) a “make code.”
It should be noted that this event will continually fire until the key being depressed
is released. The speed at which the Key-Down event fires while a key is depressed
is referred as the “repeat rate.” This is a user customizable property in virtually all
operating systems.
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2. Key-Up- The event that fires when a currently depressed key is subsequently released.
3. Keystroke- The combination of an initial Key-Down event and the corresponding
Key-Up event.
4. Hold Time- The length of time between an initial Key-Down event and the corre-
sponding Key-Up event. Hold time is sometimes referred to as “dwell time.”
5. Delay- The length of time between two successive keystrokes. It should be noted that
this time can be positive or negative (overlapping strokes). Some works refer to delay
as “latency” or “flight.”
Some highly specialized keyboards can record other information such as the pressure of key
strikes, but the foundation of the technology is based on the events defined above.
2.4.3 Feature Representation and Classification
A wide variety of algorithmic approaches have been explored as suitable candidates for the
task of keystroke recognition. The problem of keystroke recognition fits well within the
general fields of pattern recognition and machine learning; the two main tasks involved in
solving problems within these fields are to define the representation of the feature space
and the algorithm used to predict the class of samples. As mentioned in previous sections,
the features in keystroke recognition are primarily derived from the elements that make up
a keystroke. Most algorithms utilize raw times or first order statistics such as minimum,
maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation of hold times and latencies [12, 44, 66,
104, 104, 94] for feature representation. Here, hold times are for individual keys whereas
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latencies are measured between two keystrokes often defined as “digraphs.” Using these
statistics, one can either calculate fixed length feature vectors as outlined in [12] or variable
length feature vectors as outline in [16]. Fixed length or static size feature vectors will always
have a predetermined length despite the length of the input sequence. The size of variable
length or dynamic feature vectors will depend on the size of the input sequence. Although
the vast majority of keystroke recognition systems rely on single key hold times and digraph
latencies, some approaches define other feature sets including trigraph durations, ordering
of keystrokes (when shift-key modification is required), etc. [16].
Beyond feature representation, a keystroke recognition system must employ an algorithm
to predict the class of incoming samples. In general, the approaches can be broken down
into two sections: distance metric based approaches and machine learning approaches. After
calculating the feature vector for an incoming sample, the chosen algorithm must predict
the class of the sample (genuine or imposter). Many approaches will do so by comparing
the incoming sample to one or more reference samples in a template database through a
distance metric. Popular distance metrics include: Euclidean, Mahalanobis, Manhattan,
Chebyshev, and Hamming. When distance metrics are employed to compare two samples,
the smaller the score the closer the two samples are to each other. Gaines and Lisowski
[44], Garcia [45], Young and Hammon [145], and Joyce and Gupta [66] are all examples of
algorithms that utilize one or more of these distance metrics as classification schemes. Table
2.3 provides an overview of selected work in keystroke recognition including the works listed
above. The table includes the features / algorithm used, input requirements, the scope, and
performance. Under the performance column the raw totals in terms of FAR and FRR are
presented within parentheses when listed in the work.
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Table 2.3: Overview of Selected Works in Keystroke Recognition
Work Feature(s) / Algorithm Input Scope Performance
Gaines & Lisowski
(1980) [44]
Latency between 87 lowercase digraphs
using sample t-tests
300-400 word pas-
sage 2 times
7 secre-
taries
FAR 0% (0/55) FRR
4% (2/55)
Garcia (1986) [45] Latency between 87 lowercase digraphs
and space key & Complex Discrimina-
tion using Mahalanobis distance func-
tion
Individual’s name
& 1000 common
words 10 times each
(N/A)
FAR 0.01% (N/A)
FRR 50% (N/A)
Young & Hammon
(1989) [145]
Plurality of features including: digraph
latencies, time to enter selected number
of keystrokes and common words using
Euclidean distance
(N/A) (N/A) (N/A)
Joyce & Gupta
(1990) [66]
Digraph latencies between reference
strings using mean and standard devi-
ation of latency distance vectors
Username, pass-
word, first name,
last name 8 times
each
33 users
of
varying
ability
FAR 0.25% (2/810)
FRR 16.36% (27/165)
Brown & Rogers
(1993) [22]
Latencies and Hold Times using Eu-
clidean distance and neural networks
Usernames, 15-16
character avg. ≈
1,000 sequences
tested
21 & 25
users
FAR 4.2%-11.5%
(N/A) FRR (N/A)
Obaidat & Mac-
chiarolo (1993)
[104]
Digraph latencies between reference
strings using Neural Networks
15 character phrase
20 times each
6 users 97% overall accuracy
Obaidat & Sadoun
(1997) [105]
Digraph latencies and key hold times
using multiple machine learning algo-
rithms
Username 225
times / day for 8
weeks
15 users FAR 0% (N/A) FRR
0% (N/A)
Monrose & Rubin
(1997) [95]
Latencies and Durations with
Normalized Euclidean distance &
weighted/non-weighted maximum
probability
Passages of text
over 7 weeks (N/A) Identification Frame-
work
Maisuria & Ong &
Lai (1999) [91]
Digraph latencies with neural networks
(multi-layer perceptron)
passwords 60 times
over 3 periods
20 users FAR ≈ 30% (N/A)
FRR ≈ 15% (N/A)
Monrose, Weiter, &
Wetzel (2001) [94]
Digraph latencies and key hold times,
algorithm employed is unclear
8 character pass-
word
20 users FAR % (N/A) FRR
45% (N/A)
Bergadano,
Gunetti, & Pi-
cardi (2002) [16]
Trigraph duration using degree of dis-
order
683 character text 5
times
44 users FAR 0.04%
(1/10,000) FRR
4% (N/A)
Yu & Cho (2004)
[146]
GA-SVM’s and wrapper FSS on hold
times and digraph intervals
6-10 character pass-
words 150-400 gen
/ user & 75 imp
21 users FAR 0% (N/A) FRR
3.69% (N/A)
Bartlow & Cukic
(2006) [12]
Random Forests on digraph latencies
and hold times digraph latencies
usernames + 8 &
12 char passwords
≈ 9,000 sequences
41 users FAR 2% (N/A) FRR
2% (N/A)
Sung & Cho (2006)
[125]
GA-SVM’s and wrapper FSS on hold
times and digraph intervals
6-10 character
passwords 150-
400 / user & 75
imposter
21 users FAR 3.85% (N/A)
FRR 13.10% (N/A)
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As the field has matured, many other machine learning approaches have emerged as viable
solutions for prediction mechanisms in keystroke recognition. Neural networks have widely
been employed with works by Obaidat et. al [104, 105], Brown et. al [22], and Maisuria
et. al [91]. Cho and Yu have applied Support Vector Machines (SVM’s) to the problem
extensively [146, 125]. Additionally, Bartlow and Cukic explored the decision tree approach
of Random Forests [12] (see Table 2.3 for more information on listed works).
2.4.4 Applications and Challenges
In application, the uses of keystroke recognition can range anywhere from stand-alone bio-
metric systems to augmenting general computer security systems. Depending on various
system specific security characteristics such as database size and operational risks, keystroke
recognition is suitable as a stand-alone biometric. Although not on the level of physiological
biometrics such as iris, fingerprint, and face, many works in the literature indicate that the
attainable performance rates are within the scope of what some operational profiles would
require. Much like the physiological biometrics, performance is typically measured by con-
ventional error measures such as False Accept Rate (FAR), False Reject Rate (FRR), and
Equal Error Rate (EER). In terms of EER, many of the previously cited works achieve
performance ≤ 5% (see Table 2.3). Naturally, FAR and FRR’s can be tailored based on
where one wishes to fall on a traditional Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.
It is important to note that the literature has not firmly established whether the technol-
ogy is sufficient for biometric systems operating in identification mode as the focus of past
research is almost exclusively tailored to verification based systems. It is also important
to note the trend of decreasing data requirements as earlier works required extremely long
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passages of text whereas most recent works require only usernames, passwords, or both. Re-
lated to this trend, keystroke dynamics need not be applied only at the time of login, which
may lead to time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerabilities. Instead, they can be applied transpar-
ently throughout the span of a period of use. This feature can allow systems to continually
check for the presence of insider threat where an authorized user may login to a system and
subsequently allow an unauthorized user access. If a system does not require a continual
verification environment, keystroke recognition is also very suitable for a challenge-response
type framework where the user is periodically authenticated.
Besides stand-alone biometric systems, keystroke recognition can be used as an augment
to traditional username / password systems. This process is often called credential hardening
or password hardening. Monrose et. al first proposed the idea in [94] and Bartlow et. al also
explored the concept in [12]. Both works show how the addition of keystroke recognition to
traditional authentication mechanisms can drastically reduce the penetration rate of these
systems. Works of this nature may also bode well in online authentication environments
such as banking and e-commerce websites which are now commonly requiring secondary
verification layers.
Either as a stand-alone biometric or an augment to a traditional username / password
scheme, keystroke dynamics are arguably more cancellable or replaceable than physiolog-
ical biometrics. The idea of cancellable biometrics touches on the fact that the threat of
biometric compromise exists and is often realized. With fingerprint, face, iris, etc., it is
often difficult to reissue a biometric authentication mechanism as fingers, faces, and irises
are not easily removed and replaced in humans. In keystroke recognition however, the be-
havior which induces the biometric can be changed. In other words, if a user’s keystroke
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recognition template is compromised, the data in which the template is based (i.e. password
/ passphrase) can simply be changed which will result in a new biometric template. For
obvious reasons, this is seen as a very attractive feature of keystroke recognition.
Beyond the scope of academic research, many patents have been issued in the field in-
cluding: Garcia (4,621,334 - 1986) [45], Young & Hammon (4,805,222 - 1989) [145], Brown
& Rogers (5,557,686 - 1996), and Bender & Postley (7,206,938 - 2007). In addition to
patents, there are many commercial offerings of keystroke recognition systems. Two pop-
ular systems are BioPassword c©(http://www.biopassword.com/) and iMagic Software c©
(http://www.imagicsoftware.com). Systems such as these are attractive as the overhead
of keystroke recognition in terms of hardware deployment and seamless integration into
currently existing authentication systems is typically much less than that associated with
physiological biometrics such as fingerprint, iris, and face.
Despite the maturity of the field over the last 30 years, there are still many challenges
that have yet to be solved. Three main challenges are associated with the data required to
train keystroke recognition systems. First, few works have formally set out to determine the
amount of sequences required to sufficiently establish a typing signature ready for operational
deployment. For a system to be deployable, it must have a realistic training requirement
that users are willing to incur. It seems that repeatedly typing a username and password
combination 50 or more times would be unacceptable in the eyes of most users, yet 5 may
be insufficient in terms of meeting established security goals. Second, as passwords need to
be replaced / reissued, the problem of retraining needs to be addressed. Once again, these
retraining requirements have yet to be firmly established. Third, the behavioral nature of
this keystroke recognition requires a slightly more involved data collection process than what
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is typical in conventional physiological biometric systems. Most notably, one cannot simply
compare genuine input of one user to genuine input from another user in order to establish
an instance of imposter input as the data is often different for every user (i.e. usernames
/ passwords). As a result, most academic research will have users type the credentials or
data associated with other users to arrive at imposter sequences for training. Clearly this is
not feasible in operational systems as passwords are frequently reset. Therefore, the issue of
automatic generation of imposter data is an area that needs to be explored.
Chapter 3
Biometric Watermarking
3.1 Introduction
The threat associated with identity theft in a networked society becomes even more formidable
as biometric systems become commonplace as mechanisms for identity management. In or-
der to maintain long schematic life cycles and desired levels of interoperability, systems must
often store raw biometric images in addition to templates. Furthermore, despite the push
to develop international standards for templates in various biometric modalities, one can
assume raw images will continue to be stored in many systems for reasons of insurance
and support of legacy systems. Beyond these reasons, original digital images must be cap-
tured and stored when collecting evidence for criminal justice, military operations, and some
civilian applications.
Whether in an effort to protect the identity of individuals or to ensure the integrity of
a data in a chain of evidence, state of the art cryptographic protocols must be employed
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to protect the data of individuals enrolled in such systems. Furthermore, even with the
available technologies for protecting such IT systems, no system is impenetrable. Therefore,
protection mechanisms must be in place even after decryption and replaceability of authenti-
cation credentials must be available regardless of the biometric nature of the data [61]. The
work outlined in this subsection includes a framework that combines biometric watermarking
and public key cryptography to address the previously mentioned challenges. Using voice
feature descriptors to watermark raw iris images, the proposed system offers multiple lev-
els of authentication through a potentially multimodal biometric system while also offering
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation of origin through asymmetric cryptography.
Through watermarking, the scheme offers another degree of protection in terms of tracking
the origin of data, adds another layer of authentication, and improves the degree of biometric
replaceability by encoding a behavioral biometric into the raw image. By varying input pa-
rameters of our encoder, our watermarks can offer many degrees of robustness while leaving
performance of both the primary (iris) and secondary (voice) biometrics virtually unaffected.
In the work, we test the effect of our watermarking scheme on iris image quality and scoring
performance. We test the ability to extract our watermarks related to three real-life appli-
cation scenarios: database compression, partial data loss (progressive decoding), and data
transmission over a noisy channel. Additionally, we investigate the notion of rewatermarking
as it relates to the chain of evidence framework presented in Chapter 6.
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3.2 Watermark Encoding and Decoding
Amplitude Modulation is a spatial domain watermarking technique originating from [76].
This is one of the more widely studied modulation techniques in the field of communication
and signal processing. Presented below is a brief overview of such encoding and decoding
techniques as was discussed in [76], followed by how it is modified to suit biometric needs.
3.2.1 Encoding
In [76], bits are embedded multiple times by modifying pixel values, Bij , in the blue channel.
These modifications are either additive or subtractive, depending on the value of the bit, s,
and its proportionality to the luminance, Lij , as seen in Equation 3.1
Bij ← Bij + (2s− 1)Lijq


Bij ∈ embedding locations
s ∈ bit
Lij ∈ Luminance
q ∈ Encoding strength
(3.1)
3.2.2 Decoding
The decoding process estimates a linear combination of the pixels in a cross-shaped neigh-
borhood around the encoded bit as seen in Equation 3.2
Bij =
1
4c
(
c∑
k=−c
Bi+k,j +
c∑
k=−c
Bi,j+k − 2Bij ) { c ∈ neighbor size (3.2)
After decoding and arriving at an estimated pixel Bij value, the difference between the
estimated and watermarked pixels is averaged over all embedding locations for that bit.
Finally the sign of this value indicates the bit (if positive =1, if negative = 0). However,
to attenuate robustness to compression, cropping, and affine transformations, an adaptive
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thresholding method is introduced: append 2 bits to every bit stream that are always set to
{0, 1} respectively as seen in Equation 3.3
bit =
{
1 δb > δ
0
+δ1
2
0 otherwise


δ0 average diff of all 0 reference bits
δ1 average diff of all 1 reference bits
δbaverage diff of current bit
(3.3)
3.2.3 Adaptation to Biometric Data
Biometric image medium is usually captured in grayscale. Because of this, the encoding
process has to be slightly modified to take this into consideration. For example, [61] mod-
ifies the encoding equation to take in local image information such as gradient, PGM , and
standard deviation, PSD, of the cross-shaped neighborhood to adjust watermarking strength.
Parameters A and B aid in adjusting the strength of the standard deviation and gradient
when modulating the bits to be encoded. The following equation represents this adaptation.
PWM (i, j) = P (i, j)+
(2s− 1)PAV (i, j)q
(
1 +
PSD(i, j)
A
)(
1 +
PGM (i, j)
B
)
(3.4)
PAV represents the average pixels in a 5x5 neighborhood centered around i,j. Certain con-
siderations need to be addressed in terms of encoding watermarks in the biometric region
of interest (ROI) in the host image; namely, the degree in which encoding the watermark in
the ROI affects matching performance of the biometric.
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3.3 Framework Design
In this subsection we briefly describe the overall framework of the proposed system. It is
generalized such that it could be applied to various biometric authentication environments
such as internal or external web-based identity management and point-of-entry (POE) ap-
plications. Figure 3.1 shows all phases of a potential verification process. Beginning with
a request by the user (Alice) to access to some resource protected by the system (Bob),
Alice supplies her authentication data, specifically an iris image watermarked with a voice
feature descriptor. This data could be stored electronically in a web-based profile or phys-
ically on a secure token. The most important aspect of this data is that is it will have
been previously encrypted using public key infrastructure (PKI). More specifically, the data
will first be encrypted with Bob’s public key and then signed with Alice’s private key. For
an explanation of PKI see [59]. At this point, the system would process the user’s ID and
encrypted data. Bob’s first step involves decrypting the data using Alice’s public key and
his private key. Next, the system passes the authenticated and decrypted iris image through
the watermark decoder. The extraction of the voice descriptor is then used to further verify
the authenticity of the image. Finally, the system can proceed with biometric verification
using the iris image or optionally conduct multimodal verification using both the iris image
and the voice feature descriptor. Upon conclusion of the process, the system has provided
multiple levels of authentication; through cryptography, after decryption using watermark
verification, and potentially with multimodal biometric verification. The system provides
data integrity through cryptography, and non-repudiation of origin through PKI. Addition-
ally, the watermarking provides a level of tracking cryptography alone cannot provide as the
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Figure 3.1: System Framework - Enrollment and Verification
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decrypted images will still have watermarks that indicate the origin of an image. If neces-
sary, the system could also include file hashing techniques to add another measure of data
integrity and watermark fragility.
3.4 Experimental Design
We chose to test our watermarking scheme on a subset of images from the WVU biometric
database. One hundred iris classes were selected, with two images per class. Images were
watermarked with randomly generated 64 bit binary sequences. The length of the sequence
was based on the work done by Monrose, Reiter, and Wetzel in which voice was used as a
seed to generate cryptographic private keys. Using 60 bit sequence, they were able to reliably
reconstruct keys. The 60 bit sequence represented a passphrase of approximately 10 words,
this was assumed to be more than adequate length for the proposed system [93].
Our amplitude modulation technique involves three parameters for watermarking iris images;
encoding strength, the number of times the watermark sequence is encoded or repeated, and
the percentage of watermark encoding that take place in the iris itself. Encoding strength
represents the degree in which the intensity of a bit is modulated from it’s orginal value.
Number of times encoded represents the redundancy of the watermark encoding (the larger
the number the more times the same watermark is encoded in a host image). Finally, en-
coding location represents what portion of the watermark is encoded in the iris region of
the host image. The following list represents the parameter variation scheme we chose to
analyze:
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• Encoding Strength- (0.1, 0.06, 0.04)
• Number of Times Encoded- (60, 40, 20)
• Encoding Location- (67%, 33%, 0%) (in iris)
Therefore, each of the 200 iris images were watermarked a total of 27 ways (3 X 3 X 3) for a
grand total of 5,400 watermarked images. The first two parameter sets were arrived through
preliminary extraction tests. The third set of values were chosen as a trade-off between
minimally affecting the iris recognition system and keeping the images robust to tampering.
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Figure 3.2: Experimental Points of Analysis
Beyond analyzing the change in iris image quality, matching performance, and percept-
ability of the different parameter variations, we set up three watermark extractability ex-
periments outlined in Figure 3.2. The first of which involves database compression. Most
biometric databases containing raw images store data in formats derived from lossy com-
pression algorithms. As there is no current standard for compressing iris images, we took
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Original Size JPEG Quality J2K Ratio Compressed Size
301 KB 80 0.95 bpp ≈ 36 KB
301 KB 60 0.75 bpp ≈ 23 KB
301 KB 40 0.55 bpp ≈ 17 KB
301 KB 20 0.35 bpp ≈ 10 KB
Table 3.1: Compression Statistics
two popular compression algorithms (JPEG and JPEG 2000) and compressed the original
images in the following ways:
• JPEG: (compression quality)- (80,60,40,20)
• JPEG 2000 (J2K): (bpp)- (0.95,0.75,0.55,0.35)
Table 3.1 shows statistics for the two compression algorithms. It should be noted that
the compressed sizes for the JPEG images represent averages across compression qualities
whereas the sizes for J2K are exact.
Next, we attempted to simulate environments that may be subject to partial results asso-
ciated with progressive image transmission (i.e. web browsers). Using the wavelet transform,
we simulated partial image transmissions by incrementally decreasing the amount of detail
coefficients thresholded similar to techniques in [23]. The percentages of the image that were
partially decoded were as follows:
• Partial wavelet decoding:- (25%, 50%, 75%).
Figure 3.3 shows a simulated progressively transmitted image as well as an image after
application of zero mean Gaussian noise.
The final extraction experiment involved transmitting data over a noisy channel as in
mobile communication and satellite systems. We applied additive zero mean white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) to the compressed images using Equation 3.5.
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Noised Image = I(x,y) + N where N ∼ N (0, σ2)
σ2 ∈ {10−2, 10−3, 10−4, 10−5}
(3.5)
(a) JPEG (20) (b) Partial Decoding (50%)
Figure 3.3: Compressed and Progressively Decoded Irides
Beyond the notions of extractability in the application scenarios tested, it is important to
consider the success of the watermarking scheme in terms of specific application to a digital
chain of evidence. As we will see in Chapter 6, in the proposed framework for a digital chain
of evidence, images will be subject to ongoing watermarking and reconstruction as evidence
is passed along the chain of entities. The process involves watermarking an image at one
entity, then extracting the watermark and reconstructing the image, followed immediately
by rewatermarking the image. With this in mind, it is important to establish that the
content of the evidence does not change substantially as it is passed along the chain and
subject to this rewatermarking process. Simulating a chain of evidence with up to 10 different
entities, we examine the degree that iris images change by tracking the number of pixels that
change and the degree in which the intensity values change for those pixels that are different.
This experiment is performed by looking at 100 images from the set with the watermarking
parameter combination #17 in Table 3.2.
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3.5 Experimental Results
3.5.1 Watermark Perceptibility
As a requirement of the proposed system, watermarks should be imperceptible to the user.
Figure 3.4 shows the visibility of the watermark in two watermarking schemes. Images (a)
and (b) represent the original, (c) and (d) represent the watermarked images, and (e) and
(f) represent the difference images between the original and the watermarked. The schemes
chosen represent what we consider the most perceptible and least perceptible watermarking
parameter combinations. Clearly, the goal of imperceptibility to the naked eye is met as even
the most perceptible parameter combination is not noticeable without the help of electronic
processing techniques.
3.5.2 Effect on Image Quality
As defined in [67], overall iris image quality ranges from 0-1 based on 7 quality factors.
The original quality distribution of the experimental dataset was evenly distributed with
an approximately equal amount of images from 10 quality bins (0-0.1,0.1-0.2,0.2-0.3, etc.).
In our experiment, each of the watermarking parameter combinations have been assigned a
number 1-27. Table 3.2 outlines these assignments in order of encoding strength, number
of times encoded, and percent encoded in the iris. Differences in quality between original
and watermarked as well as between original and reconstructed images were calculated. All
differences were found to be significantly small. The average quality difference across pa-
rameter combinations for watermarked images was -0.003, and the average quality difference
across parameter combinations for reconstructed images was -0.005.
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(a) Original (b) Original
(c) 0.1-60-0.67 (d) 0.04-20-0.33
(e) 0.1-60-0.67 diff. img. (f) 0.04-20-0.33 diff. img.
Figure 3.4: Perceptability of Watermarked Images
3.5.3 Effect on Matching Performance
For each user, the hamming distance is calculated between two templates obtained from
non-watermarked images. Next, a watermark is applied to all images 27 different times; one
for each combination of the parameters. Then the average hamming distance is calculated
between all reconstructed image pairs. The Equal Error Rate (EER) of the original image
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1 0.1-60-0.67 10 0.06-60-0.67 19 0.04-60-0.67
2 0.1-60-0.33 11 0.06-60-0.33 20 0.04-60-0.33
3 0.1-60-0.00 12 0.06-60-0.00 21 0.04-60-0.00
4 0.1-40-0.67 13 0.06-40-0.67 22 0.04-40-0.67
5 0.1-40-0.33 14 0.06-40-0.33 23 0.04-40-0.33
6 0.1-40-0.00 15 0.06-40-0.00 24 0.04-40-0.00
7 0.1-20-0.67 16 0.06-20-0.67 25 0.04-20-0.67
8 0.1-20-0.33 17 0.06-20-0.33 26 0.04-20-0.33
9 0.1-20-0.00 18 0.06-20-0.00 27 0.04-20-0.00
Table 3.2: Watermarking Parameter Combinations
set was calculated to be 7.164%, and the average EER across the 27 reconstructed schemes
was 6.975%. Based on this, we conclude that our watermarking scheme has little impact on
average hamming distance across all users. As a result, we believe that recognition perfor-
mance would remain relatively unaffected by our watermarking system. Cross comparing
original to watermarked images provides further evidence to this effect. The average EER
across all 27 watermarking schemes was 7.354%, not significantly higher than the original
EER.
3.5.4 Extraction after DB Compression
Figure 3.5 shows the effect of JPEG compression on watermark extractability. The x-axis
represents each of the 27 parameter combinations as seen in Table 3.2. The y-axis represents
average percentage bit error across all 200 images for each parameter combination. As the
graph indicates, our watermarking scheme offers an average bit error at or below 5% for
JPEG compression down to a quality of 40 for many parameter combinations. Figure 3.6
shows the effect of J2K compression on extractability. We see here that the extractability
seems to be more robust offering even more combinations below 5% average bit error across
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Figure 3.5: Extractability: Original vs. JPEG compressed
compression levels. Furthermore, we see less sensitivity to a change in the encoding strength
(see parameter combinations 9-10 & 18-19).
3.5.5 Extraction after Partial Progressive Transmission
Figure 3.7 shows the ability to extract watermarks after various intervals of partial progres-
sive image transmission. The intervals were applied to a previously JPEG compressed image
at a quality level of 80. The graph demonstrates that the first 6 parameter combinations
allow for relatively successful watermark extraction with bit errors falling below 5%. This
holds true with up to 50% of the image partially decoded.
Figure 3.8 shows the same partial progressive extraction after J2K compression at 0.95
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Figure 3.6: Extractability: Original vs. J2K compressed
bpp. We again notice that the J2K compression appears to be less detrimental to the
extraction process, offering lower levels of bit error compared to similar JPEG compression
ratios.
3.5.6 Extraction after Transmission over a Noisy Channel
We found extraction at a level below 5% bit error was attainable at three amounts of additive
white gaussian noise (AWGN) (10−5,10−4,10−3) for the first 7 watermarking parameter com-
binations on JPEG (80) compressed images. These results can be seen in Figure 3.10 Once
again consistent with the J2K compression results, extraction in our watermarking scheme
was less sensitive to AWGN applied to 0.95 bpp J2K compressed images as compared to the
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Figure 3.7: Extractability:JPEG Partial Progressive Transmission
JPEG (80) compressed images as seen in Figure 3.10 In this case, it offered approximately
20 combinations with bit error less than or equal to 5% for noise levels (10−5,10−4,10−3).
Furthermore, it offered 6 combinations below 5% bit error at noise level (10−2).
3.5.7 Rewatermarking Along a Chain of Evidence
As mentioned in the experimental design, we also considered the success of the watermarking
scheme in terms of specific application to a digital chain of evidence. With this in mind,
it is important to establish that the content of the evidence does not change substantially
as it is passed along the chain and subject to this rewatermarking process. Simulating the
generation of evidence, we first watermarked 100 images with 64 bit binary sequences which
3.5. Experimental Results 51
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Parameter Combination
M
ea
n 
%
 B
it 
Er
ro
r
Watermark Extractability: J2K Partial Progressive Image Transmission
 
 
J2K 0.95 BPP − 25%
J2K 0.95 BPP − 50%
J2K 0.95 BPP − 75%
J2K 0.95 BPP
Figure 3.8: Extractability:J2K Partial Progressive Transmission
could simulate a biometric feature vector as in the previous experiments. Then, to simulate
transmission of the evidence across a chain of entities we apply the following three-step
process 10 times on all of the 100 images:
1. Extract watermark and verify its validity.
2. Reconstruct image so evidence viewing / analysis can take place.
3. Rewatermark the reconstructed image with current entity’s biometric feature vector
before transmission to next entity in the chain.
To analyze the effect of rewatermarking on the appearance of the iris digital evidence,
Figure 3.11 shows the percentage of pixels in the reconstructed image which have different
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Figure 3.9: Extractability:JPEG Noise
values compared to the original, unwatermarked iris digital evidence. We see that after the
second entity in the chain reconstructs the evidence after extracting the watermark from
the first entity, 0.14% or 424 out of 307, 200 (640 x 480) pixels are different as compared
to the original evidence. Note, this figure represents the average difference across all 100
iris images tested. Looking further at the figure, this mean percentage difference between
the reconstructed images and the original images linearly increases as the evidence is moved
along the chain with the final difference falling at 1.35% or 4, 149 pixels. Having established
the percentage of pixels which change as the evidence is moved along a chain of entities, we
look into the degree in which changed pixels vary in terms of intensity. Figure 3.12 takes the
same form as the previous figure except the y-axis reflects the average intensity difference
for pixels of the reconstructed images having different values than the original image. In
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Figure 3.10: Extractability:J2K Noise
this case, the difference remains steady around 3.29 intensity points as the evidence moves
along the chain. Naturally, this is a function of the encoding strength parameter chosen.
As mentioned, the encoding parameter combination chosen was #17 from Table 3.2. This
resulted in perfect extraction of the watermark in every case. The differences observed
in quanity and intensity between the original and reconstructed images along the chain of
evidence are not likely perceptible to the human eye. This is supported by Figure 3.13 which
displays the reconstructed images after the first and tenth reconstructions. Looking only
at (a) and (b), one would not be able to distinguish between the two images without the
assistance of software techniques. Furthermore, in (c) and (d), the visible portions of the
difference maps between the original and reconstructed images (first and tenth) are faint at
best. Besides human perceptibilty, it is unlikely that such differences would have any level
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Figure 3.11: Percentage Pixel Differences Between Reconstructed and Original Evidence
of serious impact on software-based biometric analysis that might take place at an arbitrary
entity in the chain. This is corroborated by the results of the experiments on biometric
image quality and matching performance as well.
3.6 Chapter Summary
The combination of the techniques employed by the system offers various attractive features
and advantages. It affords multiple levels of authentication; through cryptography, after
decryption through watermarking, and through multimodal biometric verification. By wa-
termarking a feature vector from a behavioral biometric, we achieve both added protection
after decryption and a degree of biometric replaceability both at the raw image level and at
the feature vector level. Replaceability is achieved as a new watermark can be embedded to
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Figure 3.12: Intensity Differences Between Reconstructed and Original Evidence
replace the iris biometric or a new passphrase can be assigned to replace the voice biometric.
The system also decreases the chance of a true compromise of credentials. Through public
key encryption, the profile is resistant to exposure whether stored electronically or on a smart
card. The framework offers multiple levels of forgery detection with a combination of water-
marks and file hashing. Essentially the profile can be considered completely fragile as it can
detect modification of a single bit through cryptographic hash comparisons. Additionally,
the system offers non-repudiation of origin through PKI as well as origin tracking through
watermarking. Finally, the cost of compromise is lower than systems watermarking biomet-
ric data with physiological biometric templates as they effectively double the risk associated
with compromised profiles / tokens. In these systems, an unauthorized user has indefinite
access to both the original raw biometric data (one modality) and the biometric template
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data (another modality). Given template reconstruction technologies, both biometrics can
be considered compromised, whereas only one biometric is compromised in the event of a
behavioral template watermark (replaceable) [7].
Beyond the attractive features of the framework, we have shown that our watermarking
scheme does not significantly impede iris image quality or biometric matching performance.
Additionally, we have demonstrated that our watermarking scheme provides a degree of
robustness to three realistic watermarking application scenarios: database compression, data
transmission over a noisy channel, and partial data loss (progressive decoding). Finally, we
have demonstrated how rewatermarking images as evidence moves along the entities in a
digital chain of evidence is not likely to have detrimental impacts on the evidence in terms of
human pereceptibility or biometric matching. The results should suit systems requiring the
establishment of a chain of evidence nicely as reconstructed images have minimal quantities
of altered pixels.
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Figure 3.13: Perceptibility of Reconstructed Evidence Along the Chain of Evidence.
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Chapter 4
Digital Hardware Fingerprinting
4.1 Introduction
As the field of biometrics continues to grow, so does its areas of application. Such areas
can include access control in protected sites and border control, remote authentication in
commercial applications, and identification of criminal suspects or enemies on the battle-
field. Regardless of the intended application, various measures must be taken to ensure
the accuracy and integrity of these deployments. Two ways that biometric systems can be
compromised include fabrication and alteration of data. Fabrication of biometric data could
occur at many points within a biometric system and usually is the result of an act with
malicious intent. Whether at the time of data acquisition, matching, or database access,
various vulnerabilities may allow raw biometric images to be created and maliciously in-
jected into a system. Similarly, biometric data may also be maliciously altered throughout
the course of operation in a biometric system. Besides actions with malicious intent, un-
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intentional alteration of images during the collection, transmission, or storage blocks of a
system can take place. To make matters worse, whether intentional or unintentional, there
often is no obvious cue that an image has been fabricated or altered in the first place. This
is of particular importance to applications where a “chain of evidence” must be established.
Such a chain is useful in assembling cases to prosecute criminal activity, establishing identity
dominance in the battlefront, and discovering fraudulent activity in commercial systems.
In an effort to minimize the presence of fabricated / altered images in such systems, the
notion of source identification is applied. Falling under the field of digital forensics, digital
hardware fingerprinting provides the ability to identify and validate the source hardware
which captured an image. Whether establishing a chain of evidence or addressing a specific
biometric vulnerability, application of digital hardware fingerprinting for biometric image
source validation should prove to be very useful.
Digital hardware fingerprinting is the process of identifying the source hardware used to
capture an image regardless of the scenery or primary image content. The primary method
of identifying the source hardware from which an image originated is analyzing differences
in images resulting from imaging sensor imperfections [86]. Due to slight inconsistencies in
the production process, all sensors are subject to small manufacturing imperfections. These
imperfections lead to the necessary observance of noise (sometimes visually undetectable
by humans) in images collected. Although previous work has focused on devices using
optical technology to capture images, such noise would also be present in sensors relying on
different technologies for image capture such as capacitance, thermal, or piezoelectric signals.
Identification of source hardware can potentially occur at different levels of granularity.
Figure 4.1 shows four levels that may be considered in a source hardware identification
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Figure 4.1: Source Hardware Identification Levels.
problem: technology, brand, model, and unit. Based on the four levels, various questions
can be answered:
• Was the image in question captured from a sensor relying on technology X or Y?
(Technology)
• Was the image in question captured from a device manufactured by vendor X or Y?
(Brand)
• Was the image in question captured from a device corresponding to model X or Y
manufactured by vendor Z? (Model)
• Was the image in question captured from a unit A or unit B of model X manufactured
by vendor Z? (Unit)
Naturally, unique challenges exist to performing source model identification at different lev-
els. In this chapter, we provide a look into the feasibility of determining source identification
at the unit level (4) using photo-response nonuniformity noise (PRNU) present in biometric
fingerprint readers as well as biometric iris cameras. To our knowledge, it is the first work to
demonstrate the ability to identify the hardware source used to collect biometric fingerprint
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and iris images. To do so, we adopt the technique presented by Lukas et al. in [86]. Secondly,
we formally establish the effect of varying the amount of images used to arrive at reference
templates for capture devices at the unit level.
4.2 Approach
As a means to identify biometric capture devices, whether fingerprint readers or iris cameras,
we adopt the approach proposed by Lukas et al. in [86]. This approach is based on estimating
pixel nonuniformity (PNU), a portion of the photo-repsonse nonuniformity (PRNU) inherent
to every image captured by the readers. The remainder of this section is broken down into
two parts: a description of the general framework for identifying hardware sources through
PNU noise and a description of the wavelet-based denoising algorithm utilized in [86].
Identification Process The process of device identification can then be broken down
into two main steps:
1. Calculate Reference Patterns. For each fingerprint reader, calculate a reference
pattern by taking an average of the noise residual estimates across multiple training
images as seen in Equation 4.1.
Ri =
∑N
k=1 p
(k) − F (p(k))
N
(4.1)
Here, N represents the number of images used to generate the reference pattern, Ri,
p(k) represents each image in the training set, and F represents a denoising filter. It
should be noted that while F can represent any denoising filter, Lukas et al. found that
4.2. Approach 63
a wavelet-based approach yielded the best results [86]. The specifics of the wavelet-
based denoising is described later in this chapter. Figure 4.2 shows an example of
reference patterns for two different fingerprint readers within one of the databases
tested.
(a) Microsoft (b) BioTouch
Figure 4.2: Example reference patterns for Microsoft and BioTouch Readers from the WVU
database.
2. Correlate Noise Residuals to Reference Patterns. For each image to be tested,
extract the noise residual p(k) − F (p(k)), and measure the correlation, C, to each
reference pattern, Ri, for all of the reference patterns in question. In [86], Lukas et
al. propose the correlation measure seen in Equation 4.2, although in theory, any
correlation measure could be applied.
Ci = corr(p,Ri) =
(p− p¯) · (Ri − R¯i)
‖(p− p¯)‖‖(Ri − R¯i)‖ (4.2)
Wavelet-based Denoising Algorithm The wavelet-based denoising approach in [86]
is described in four steps.
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1. Calculate the first through fourth wavelet decompositions of the original noisy image
using the 8-tap Daubachies Quadratic Mirror Filters (QMF). The vertical, horizontal,
and diagnoal subbands are denoted by v(i, j), h(i, j), and d(i, j) respectively. Here
(i, j) represents the coefficients for each pixel in each of the three subbands.
2. In each subband, estimate the local variance of the noise-free image for each wavelet
coefficient using MAP estimation for four sizes of a W × W neighborhood N , for
W ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9} as seen in Equation 4.3.
σˆ2W (i, j) = max
(
0,
1
W 2
∑
(i,j)∈N
h2(i, j)− σ20
)
(4.3)
Then apply Equation 4.4 to arrive at the minimum of the four variances as the final
estimate.
σˆ2W (i, j) = min
(
σ23(i, j), σ
2
5(i, j), σ
2
7(i, j), σ
2
9(i, j)
)
(4.4)
3. Determine the denoised wavelet coefficients by applying the Wiener filter as seen in
Equation 4.5
hden(i, j) = h(i, j)
σˆ2(i, j)
σˆ2(i, j) + σ20
(4.5)
Similarly, the filter is applied to v(i, j) and d(i, j).
4. Steps 1-3 are repeated for each level and color channel.
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In [86], the authors used σ0 = 5 in the experiments as do we in this work. It should be
noted that due to the grayscale nature of the fingerprint and iris images, it is not necessary
to perform Step 4 across multiple color channels.
4.3 Experimental Design
As mentioned previously, this work investigated the notion of source identification in both
fingerprint readers and iris cameras. In total, four databases were tested including three
fingerprint databases and one iris database. Of the three fingerprint datasets considered, the
first was a WVU collection consisting of images from two sensor models (3 units each). The
second collection came from both WVU and Clarkson which consists of images from three
sensor models (2 units each). The last set is from the first three years of the Fingerprint
Verification Competition (FVC) which consists of images from 8 different units [88, 89, 90].
The WVU data was collected specifically with hardware fingerprinting experiments in mind,
while the other two datasets were collected primarily for biometric testing purposes. With
that in mind, the WVU dataset consists of fingerprint images from 4 subjects who each
provided 100 images per sensor (25 images from 4 digits) for a total of 2, 400 images. The
WVU / Clarkson datasets each have substantially more images and the experiment only used
a subset of the fingerprint images available from each. Specifically, we randomly selected
1, 000 images per sensor pertaining to the right index and thumb. The FVC dataset was
comprised of 10 subjects with 8 images per subject, collected from the index and middle
finger, totaling 640 images. A summary of fingerprint readers including model details can be
found in Table 4.2 and example fingerprints and corresponding noise residuals can be found
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in Table 4.1.
The final dataset tested comes from images collected with four different iris cameras.
The first set of images comes from the ICE Challenge database and the second set comes
from the CASIA III database [99, 107]. The final two sets of images were collected with
two different iris cameras at WVU. Considering only images with dimensions of 640 X 480
pixels, 200 images were used from each device. A summary of iris cameras including model
details can be found in Table 4.4 and example images and corresponding noise residuals can
be found in Table 4.3.
Although the amount of users in the WVU and FVC data may be prohibitively small
for a traditional biometric experiment, we note this experiment is not studying biometric
recognition or identification. Instead, we are studying sensor identification. To that effect, we
believe the variety subjects and associated number of fingerprint provides sufficient variation
for our tests. We applied a cross-validation framework for all datasets for testing the proposed
methods. In our experiments, we tested the success of the digital hardware fingerprinting
techniques while varying the number of images used to generate reference patterns using
the methodology described in the previous section. Table 4.5 lists the training and testing
breakdowns for each dataset. It is important to note that 10 fold cross validation was applied
for each test. Therefore, total number of tests in the WVU and FVC datase results range
depending on the split with WVU ranging from 3, 990 (399 * 10) to 1, 440 (144 * 10) and
FVC results range from 790 (79 * 10) to 160 (16 * 10) tests. On the other hand, the test
size was constant for the WVU / Clarkson set due to the availability of images and includes
includes 5, 000 tests (500 * 10 folds). Finally, applying the same 10 fold cross validation, the
number of tests in the iris experiments varied from 720 (72 * 10) to 1, 990 (199 * 10). It
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Reader Fing. Noise Sensor Fing. Noise
WVU Identix #1 WVU Microsoft #1
WVU Identix #2 WVU Microsoft #2
WVU Identix #3 WVU Microsoft #3
WVU Precise Clarkson Precise
WVU Secugen Clarkson Secugen
WVU CrossMatch Clarkson CrossMatch
FVC KeyTronic FVC Microelectronics
FVC Identicator FVC Identix
FVC Biometrika FVC Precise
FVC CrossMatch FVC DigitalPersona
Table 4.1: Example fingerprints and noise residuals from three different data sets.
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Brand Model Tech. Width Height
Microsoft Fingerprint
O 355 390
(WVU 1-3) Reader
Identix BioTouch200
O 256 255
(WVU 1-3)
Precise Biometrics AX 100
C 200 200
(WVU / Clarkson)
Secugen Hamster III
O 260 300
(WVU / Clarkson)
CrossMatch Verifier 300 LC
O 640 480
(WVU / Clarkson)
KeyTronic Secure
O 300 300
(FVC) Desktop Scanner
Microelectronics TouchChip
C 256 364
(FVC)
Identicator Technology DF-90
O 448 478
(FVC)
Identix TouchView II
O 388 374
(FVC)
Biometrika FX2000
O 296 560
(FVC)
Precise Biometrics 100 SC
C 300 300
(FVC)
CrossMatch V300
O 640 480
(FVC)
DigitalPersona U.are.U 4000
O 328 364
(FVC)
Table 4.2: Fingerprint reader details from three different data sets. Tech. = Technology
{O=optical, C=capacitive}.
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Camera Iris Image Noise Residual
ICE
CASIA
WVU 1
WVU 2
Table 4.3: Example irises and noise residuals from four different data sets.
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Image Set Brand Model Width Height
ICE LG EOU 2200 640 480
CASIA OKI IRISPASS h 640 480
WVU 1 OKI IRISPASS h 640 480
WVU 2 EverFocus EQ100A/EN 640 480
Table 4.4: Iris camera details.
WVU
Train 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256
Test 399 398 396 392 384 368 336 272 144
WVU / Clarkson
Train 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256
Test 500
FVC
Train 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 n/a n/a
Test 79 78 76 72 64 48 16 n/a n/a
Iris
Train 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 n/a
Test 199 198 196 192 184 168 136 72 n/a
Table 4.5: Experimental training variation measured in images / device / fold.
is important to note that there is no overlap of images within the training and testing sets
across any of the experiments.
4.4 Experimental Results
4.4.1 Fingerprint Readers
The results in this section report sensor identification at the unit level. In this case, we wish
to distinguish which unit the image was captured from given a pool of units. Therefore,
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a test noise residual is compared against reference patterns for each unit from the dataset
in consideration. For each dataset, we provide example histograms of match / non-match
distributions, confusion matrices for specific train / test sets, and Cumulative Match Char-
acteristic (CMC) curves as the train / test splits vary.
FVC Dataset
The first set of experiments was performed on the FVC data. Figure 4.3 displays the dif-
ference in correlation between match and non-match comparisons of test noise residuals and
sensor reference patterns. As we can see in the figure, perfect separation is achieved when
considering Identicator test residuals against reference patterns produced from 32 training
images per sensor. While perfect separation was achieved in this instance, this was not the
case across all sensors in all train and test splits. An example of which can be seen in Table
??. In the table, we see that the Identix test residuals are occasionally misclassified as hav-
ing originated from other sensors. It is interesting to note that the distribution of errors is
fairly uniform across the other seven sensors. With the exception of the Identix sensor, no
errors are made on experiments training on at least 8 images. Figure 4.4 shows a Cumulative
Match Characteristic (CMC) plot which indicates the overall accuracy across sensors as the
train / test splits are varied. Here we see the rank one identification rate when training on 1
image per sensor falls around 85%. This is fairly high considering this is the smallest amount
of data that could be used to generate a reference pattern for a sensor. When 64 images are
used to generate reference patterns for each sensor, the rank 1 identification rate exceeds
98%. Furthermore, the only reason the identification rate is not 100% is due to errors made
on classifying the Identix noise residuals.
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Figure 4.3: FVC example match and non-match distributions with 32 training images per sensor.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 480 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Microelectonic 0 480 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identicator 0 0 480 0 0 0 0 0
Identix 14 18 23 365 14 13 10 28
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 480 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 480 0 0
CrossMatch 0 0 0 0 0 0 480 0
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 480
Table 4.6: FVC confusion matrix when training on 32 images per sensor
WVU Dataset
The performance on the WVU dataset is the highest among the three datasets considered.
Virtually all instances achieve perfect separation, therefore it is not beneficial to display
a histogram of match and non-match distributions. However, in Table 4.7, the confusion
matrix resulting from training on 1 image per sensor is displayed. Again considering the
minimal training requirement, we see only sporadic errors across the 3, 990 test cases per
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Figure 4.4: FVC sensor identification as a function of training set size.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
BioTouch #1 BioTouch #2 BioTouch #2 Microsoft #1 Microsoft #2 Microsoft #3
BioTouch #1 3942 14 32 1 1 0
BioTouch #2 6 3967 17 0 0 0
BioTouch #3 3 10 3977 0 0 0
Microsoft #1 0 0 0 3989 1 0
Microsoft #2 0 0 0 0 3990 0
Microsoft #3 0 0 0 0 0 3990
Table 4.7: WVU confusion matrix when training on 1 image per sensor
sensor. This high level of performance is reflected in the CMC curve shown in Figure 4.5.
Here, only 2 train / test scenarios do not achieve perfect rank 1 identification (training on
1 and 2 images per sensor). Nevertheless, the rank 1 identification when using only 1 image
per sensor exceeds 99%.
WVU / Clarkson Dataset
The most challenging dataset for sensor identification ending has been the WVU / Clarkson
dataset. Observing a notable difference compared to the previous to databases, Figure 4.6
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Figure 4.5: WVU sensor identification as a function of training set size.
shows a slight overlap between match and non-match distributions when generating reference
templates from 128 training images. In all but one sensor in the WVU and FVC datasets,
training on 128 images exceeded the minimum required to achieve perfect separation. This
pattern can also be seen in Table A.22 which displays the confusion matrix when training
on 128 images. While the results can still be considered promising as the overall rank 1
identification accuracy is near 90%, we observe far more errors across the test cases. It is
also interesting to note where the errors are made. Somewhat intuitively, more errors are
made misclassifying the WVU Secugen noise residuals as Clarkson Secugen noise residuals
than any other sensor’s residuals. This may be the case as they are the same model sensor.
Surprisingly, this pattern does not hold true for the WVU CrossMatch residuals as they are
misclassified as Clarkson residuals the fewest number of times when compared to the other
sensors. We are still investigating why this may be the case. Figure 4.7 displays the CMC
plots for the final dataset. Once again, this data proved to be the most challenging of the
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4979 0 0 21 0 0
WVU Secugen 364 3146 179 492 596 223
WVU CrossMatch 313 188 3781 366 246 106
Clarkson Precise 32 3 0 4963 2 0
Clarkson Secugen 14 25 7 14 4940 0
Clarkson CrossMatch 27 1 2 1 10 4959
Table 4.8: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 128 images per sensor
three sets as we see the rank 1 identification accuracy drops to 45%. However, any reasonable
application of source identification will likely have access to more than one training image to
generate reference patterns. Along those lines, the rank 1 identification rate when training
on 256 images is approximately 95% which can once again be considered promising results.
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Figure 4.6: WVU / Clarkson example match and non-match distributions with 128 training
images per sensor.
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Figure 4.7: WVU / Clarkson sensor identification as a function of training set size.
4.4.2 Iris Cameras
Although we consider fewer devices (a function of availability alone), the hardware finger-
printing experiments for the iris devices are similarly encouraging. Figure 4.8 displays match
and non-match distributions for noise residual correlations to the ICE LG camera’s reference
patterns after training on 4 images. We see that although the separation between match and
non-match distributions is not perfect, there is a well defined split between the distributions.
This trend holds true against all sensors when training on only 4 images per sensor. This
can be seen in the confusion matrix for the identification experiment in Table 4.9. Here a
small number of classification errors are made in two of the sensors across each of the 1, 960
tests. This amount of errors continues to drop as more images are used to generate reference
patterns.
This relationship is visualized in Figure 4.9. In the figure we see the rank 1 identification
rate approaches 98%. Furthermore, this rate approaches 100% after using 8 or more images to
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Figure 4.8: ICE LG sensor example match and non-match distributions with 4 training images
per sensor.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1951 8 1 0
CASIA OKI 0 1960 0 0
WVU OKI 20 13 1926 1
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1960
Table 4.9: Iris confusion matrix when training on 4 images per camera
generate reference templates for each device. These results are encouraging as they indicate
that the approach can be used to perform source validation on devices that capture face
(from [86], fingerprint, and iris images despite the different technologies used within the
different capture devices associated with each modality.
4.5 Discussion
While the results of the experiments clearly demonstrate that inherent PNU noise can be used
as a means for performing sensor hardware identification in biometric fingerprint readers and
78 Chapter 4. Digital Hardware Fingerprinting
1 2 3 4
97.5
98
98.5
99
99.5
100
Rank
Id
en
tif
ica
tio
n 
Ra
te
 %
Overall Accuracy Across Sensors
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
Figure 4.9: Iris camera identification as a function of training set size.
iris cameras, there are a number of considerations which must be mentioned. Most notably,
the databases tested only contain limited sets of pairs of identical units (3 sensors of each
model in WVU, 2 sensors of each model in WVU / Clarkson, and 2 matching iris camera
models). Increasing the number of identical units may result in a decrease in identification
performance. At this point, it is unclear if sensor identification with the applied technique
would be possible in a pool of 100’s or 1, 000’s of the same model sensor at the unit level.
Additionally, as different models of fingerprint readers capture images at different resolutions
(see 4.2) cropping of noise residuals was performed when necessary as the chosen method of
correlation requires that the noise residuals have the same dimension. Although the results
seem to indicate this method of handling dissimilar images sizes is sufficient, there are a
number of options one may choose to exercise when dealing with this issue, not the least of
which is resizing the original image before denoising. The images could be resized but this
may introduce artifacts that could artificially enhance performance. To avoid this, different
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correlation procedures could be applied such as normalized cross correlation which would
not require equally sized images.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter investigated the notion of sensor identification in biometric fingerprint readers
and iris cameras. We established the prospects of performing identification based on estimat-
ing PNU noise inherent to image through wavelet based denoising as proposed by Lukas et al.
in [86]. Beyond presenting the ability to perform sensor fingerprinting on biometric devices
at the unit level, we established the effect of varying the number of images used in arriving at
reference patterns. Having looked at the minimum training requirements, we conclude that
sensor identification can be performed with a great deal of accuracy (in three databases) even
if one has access to only 1 image to establish a reference pattern. The application of a digital
hardware fingerprinting technique such as the one tested in this work can be used both as a
method of counteracting vulnerabilities at the time of check in biometric systems as well as
allowing an individual to establish a “chain of evidence” which is often critical in systems
such as assembling cases to prosecute criminal activity, establishing identity dominance in
the battlefront, and discovering fraudulent activity in commercial systems.
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Chapter 5
Keystroke Dynamics
5.1 Introduction
Over the history of the field, a large number of keystroke dynamics studies have taken place
in controlled environments. Whether subject to heavily supervised lab conditions, a variety
of explicit rules, or standardized and uniform capture equipment, these experiments are not
typically in line with our proposed application environments. Although stand-alone deploy-
ment in an environment with homogenous equipment is undoubtedly still a relevant area
of application, current application demands are moving toward web-oriented environments
in which choice of hardware, user supervision, and other external noise factors are not con-
trollable. Although we admittedly do not cover all potential sources of noise in this type
of application (i.e. mimicry), we attempt to simulate this “free” environment to the best
of our ability by employing a completely unsupervised, web-based collection system with no
hardware restrictions. This environment will be well suited to chain of evidence applications
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where individual entities within the chain may be accessing evidence from remote unsuper-
vised situations.
As noted previously, the relationship between the individuals components of the creden-
tial sets are of specific interest to this work. In particular, the degree of familiarity that
the user has to each component. Figure 5.1 presents the idea that the more times a user
is exposed to a stimulus (component of a credential set), the more familiar they become
with typing the component. We hypothesize that the username is easily the most familiar
of the three components considered as most individuals are exposed (required to type it)
multiple times on a daily basis. Following the username, an English password is likely the
component with a lesser degree of typing familiarity as it may not be typed daily but it has
probably been typed before if not multiple times. Finally, a random password containing
characters of varying capitalization, digits, and special characters probably represents the
lowest attainable familiarity as there is very little chance that the user has ever seen such
a password, much less typed it. By assigning these three types of components to create
credential sets, we are able to investigate the degree in which familiarity to input stimulus
affects keystroke dynamics performance. Here again, we find this to be of particular interest
in chain of evidence applications where the input stimulus is likely to be some derivation of
the entity’s name, which in turn can serve as a form of digital signature.
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Figure 5.1: Typing Familiarity vs. Exposure to Stimulus.
5.2 Experimental Design
5.2.1 Collection System
To achieve a web based architecture for the collection system, front-end client-side Java
applets were developed in the NetBeans Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and
designed to run within standard web browsers (Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, Netscape)
using the Sun Java Console. This offered both a tested open source platform as well as the
bulk of the computation to occur in the client computers. On the server side, a MySQL
database (also an open source product) was used to house the data. Therefore, once client-
side computation was finished, the input was entered into the database via the previously
established client-server connection [10]. It should also be noted that the use of a web-based
collection system does not preclude application of the techniques used in this work in non
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web-based applications such as terminals and mail clients.
During the registration process, each user was given two sets of username / password
credential sequences. The username remained the same across both sets of credentials and
was of the form Firstname.Lastname with the first letter of each name capitalized. The first
password was as an eight letter lowercase English word taken from a cryptographic dictionary
attack list [122]. Examples of such passwords included computer and swimming. The second
password, consisted of 12 randomly generated characters in a consistent pattern. The format
of the pattern was as follows:
SUUDLLLLDUUS
where S is a special symbol, U is an uppercase letter, L is a lowercase letter and D is a digit.
Examples of such passwords include +AL4lfav8TB= and UC8gkum5WH. This pattern was
not intended to elicit any specific behavior but only to allow for easy interpretation of
potentially ambiguous symbols. The extra length of the pseudo-random passwords was
incorporated to arrive at what are considered to be cryptographically strong passwords.
Beyond the structure of the input, the behavioral nature of this biometric scheme re-
quired a slightly more involved data collection process than what is typical in conventional
physiological biometric systems. Most notably, one cannot simply compare genuine input of
one user to genuine input from another user in order to establish an instance of imposter
input. In this study, the passwords were different for each and every individual. Therefore,
the collection tool required the development of two different user interfaces. One interface
requests users to input the genuine credentials provided to them in the registration phase.
The second interface requests users to input the credentials assigned to another user, gen-
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(a) Registration Front End.
(b) Genuine Input Front End.
(c) Imposter Input Front End.
Figure 5.2: The three main pages for data collection (a) The registration front end. (b) The
genuine input front end. (c) The imposter input front end.
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erating an imposter authentication attempt. Figure 5.2 shows the registration (a), genuine
input (b), and imposter input (c) front ends.
Within the genuine input front end, users were asked to input each of their credentials
(username + password1 and username + password2) 5 times every day for approximately
three weeks. The imposter input front-end was slightly different and can be seen in Figure 5.2
(c). In this front end, users were provided with credentials of a different user registered used.
To avoid inadvertently collecting genuine data in the imposter section, user always provides
his / her username from the “My UserName” field. Upon selection of the username, the data
collection system populates the “Imposter Credentials” fields, automatically selecting a pair
of credentials that is short on imposter data. In this way, the number of imposter sequences
was kept balanced over the set of all the enrolled users.
At this point, the user simply logged in the same way as if this were his / her own genuine
credentials. Pending a successful collection step, the new username / password pair appear
in the window and the process repeats itself. Similar to the genuine input screen, users were
asked to input a total of 10 imposter sequences per day.
5.2.2 User Supervision
As mentioned previously, we attempted to minimize the supervision component of the data
collection. To that effect, users were only provided with a basic series of instructions and
short video clips (for those inclined) to explain the functionality and expected use of the
system. Although a large number of the students were included in the study (from our lab
and university classes), there was no requirement to offer samples in the lab or in an on-
campus setting. Additionally, many participants had no affiliation with the university and
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their data was collected from off-site locations throughout the internet. To that regard, no
face to face guidance was provided to the participants.
5.2.3 Collection Results
At the time of final analysis, the database had a total of 53 users with over 10,000 total
input sequences. After applying a minimum number of 15 valid sequences of each type of
password, a total of 41 users and 8,882 username / password sequences were used. Out of
the 8,882 total sequences, 5,094 were of type genuine and 3,788 were of type imposter. A
summarized breakdown of the data collected for each user can be found in Table 5.1. The
demographics of the database represent a fairly diverse population in many regards. The
gender split was approximately half and half, ages ranged from mid-teens to individuals
in their early 60’s, and there was also a relatively diverse racial makeup. Perhaps most
importantly, the typing ability of the population was also very diverse, ranging from the
most inept “hunt and peck” typists to individuals with professional training / experience.
In that regard, the classification algorithms not only were required to differentiate between
professional and amateur typists but also between the members these two groups. Some
of the users have been accustomed to working with multiple keyboard layouts. However,
the type of keyboard used for data collection was not controlled. We know that a large
percentage of subjects used desktop computers as well as laptops during the data collection.
This is inevitably a source of noise but also demonstrates the ability of the technique to cope
with variable hardware setups. The collection period lasted approximately one month.
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Table 5.1: Data included in the experiment. The abbreviations E, R, and T correspond to English
passwords sequences, Random passwords sequences, and total sequences. The final row includes
the total number of users, average length for usernames and both types of passwords, and the total
number of each type of input sequence collected.
UserID Username English Random Genuine Seq. Imposter Seq.
Length Password (E) Password (R) E R T E R T
01 12 kathleen @QZ4ozka1XE$ 120 110 230 46 46 92
03 13 williams ]RR4axpe0WA> 048 050 098 46 46 94
04 14 rosemary :LC6nvau9OO~ 073 020 093 47 47 94
05 09 mitchell >YH2avia0ER# 062 070 132 47 47 94
06 16 wolfgang @WI7tjeb8WX} 117 108 225 47 47 94
07 13 aerobics }YK2zquv9IQ+ 083 076 159 47 47 94
08 10 firebird .MS1suyf8MP^ 053 052 105 47 47 94
09 11 fountain (GC5idxx8TH{ 051 051 102 47 47 94
10 18 caroline ^ZT7wyaz6JA[ 016 017 033 47 47 94
11 12 zeppelin !CN0srui6ZO= 122 119 241 46 46 92
12 19 bumbling ~XM6bywn6JL? 074 085 159 46 46 92
13 09 director ‘VA0snuv1HA: 090 104 194 46 46 92
14 12 gonzales &ZL7yfjj0GK* 059 061 120 46 46 92
15 16 password ?KK6cvuc1NK| 059 088 147 46 46 92
17 14 business ;OI6vjog4QN> 053 058 111 46 46 92
18 12 fletcher &UV1lkda5YH{ 062 065 127 46 46 92
21 10 swimming ;KO3ovpt4QC> 046 021 067 46 46 92
23 17 wheeling ;LB3chtu2YX‘ 118 137 255 46 46 92
24 12 newcourt :ZQ5grpx8VH; 027 028 055 46 46 92
25 15 snoopdog ,GG5ruft6IG+ 052 045 097 46 46 92
26 07 colorado $ZZ9ilfg9RJ( 043 025 068 46 46 92
27 14 homebrew *TY1drmj7CR$ 158 108 266 46 46 92
28 11 dolphins [LO2uqam8UI+ 047 041 088 46 46 92
29 15 plymouth )VS0iaka5WW! 048 042 090 46 46 92
30 14 broadway ;PG3xuel9LU} 054 049 103 46 46 92
31 13 woodwind }EZ7mjjp4YM+ 075 076 151 46 46 92
32 14 mountain &BA1ishf0FC| 054 041 095 46 46 92
33 10 strangle =BP8duim7IF@ 091 089 180 46 46 92
34 12 strangle <WN1zegb5RS$ 077 074 151 46 46 92
35 13 princess >GD0dgby6JU{ 030 016 046 46 46 92
37 13 clusters @UK8uudo5GS. 033 029 062 46 46 92
38 10 martinez _UC8gkum5WH@ 030 021 051 46 46 92
40 13 tacobell [VB6jveb2PC~ 015 017 032 46 46 92
43 12 baritone &FO4ovcv0VK! 028 029 057 46 46 92
44 14 frighten $IP2ulld5QT@ 053 051 104 46 46 92
46 12 starwars $SP3lhkt1YX{ 031 039 070 46 46 92
47 15 thompson #PO5dlfq0JW: 108 129 237 46 46 92
48 14 explorer <JT5ocyi8TK= 099 099 198 46 46 92
49 15 elephant &XQ5jwsp8KA] 080 080 160 46 46 92
51 13 springer @SF5sjnd5EY/ 017 015 032 46 46 92
53 12 sweatpea ^RO8wxps1HI) 062 041 103 46 46 92
41 12.93 8 12 2,618 2,476 5,094 1,894 1,894 3,788
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5.3 Authentication Algorithm and Features
As mentioned in the related work chapter, a plethora of algorithms have been investigated
as candidates for authentication mechanisms throughout the history of keystroke dynamics
research. The scope ranges from simple distance metrics between probe and gallery tem-
plates, to complicated multi-layer neural networks. In this work, we arrive at feature vectors
containing raw hold times and inter-key delays and use the decision tree based Random
Forests algorithm developed by Breiman [20] to classify input sequences. It is important
to note that we are assuming a verification framework where an identity is claimed. This
assumption leads to a two class problem; deciding whether an input sequence is genuine
or imposter in nature. The following two subsections provide expanded descriptions of the
Random Forest algorithm (including the nature of the training and testing) and the feature
set in which classification was based.
5.3.1 Random Forests and Training / Testing Framework
An elegant and powerful algorithm, Random Forests is named after two main characteristics.
One, it is is based on the development of a “forest” of decision tree classifiers, each being
similar to a C5.0 decision trees developed by Quinlan [1]. Two, the method of generating
the forests is based on the random sampling of features in the attribute space. The tree
generation algorithm works as follows: each tree is grown based on a random sample selection
of 2
3
of the instance population. In each decision tree that populates the forest: nodes,
branches, and leaves are generated by continuously choosing the feature that yields the best
split of the data based on m randomly selected features. Sub-tree generation continues to
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the extent possible without pruning. Once all trees have been generated, new instances of
feature vectors are passed through the trees of the forest and a voting process takes place to
determine the classification result.
There are a number of attractive advantages Random Forests have over other machine
learning algorithms. Our study pays particular attention to two of them. One, due to the
2
3
sampling used to train each tree, the remaining 1
3
so called out-of-bag (OOB) sample is
used to test the classification performance. Therefore, training and test sets do not need
to be explicitly separated and the estimated error results are said to provide conservative
estimates of future performance. Two, the ability to define varying voting schemes allows
for generating forests tailored to specific matching applications. For instance, a 10%-90%
voting scheme for genuine and imposter classes places particular emphasis on the minimizing
the FRR, whereas a 90%-10% scheme reverses the requirement, focusing attention on the
FAR. This mechanism allows for the generation of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves which describe an entire range of achievable performance characteristics relative to
FAR and FRR’s. Other learners typically generate only a single operating point along a ROC
curve. We generated 19 Random Forests for every user, each with a different voting scheme
with voting increments of 0.05, ranging between 0.05-0.95 and 0.95-0.05. Furthermore, for
each forest, 500 trees were generated and the default value of parameter m (features to
consider at each node split) was used. In this case, m =
√
X, or the square root of the total
number of attributes in the feature space, (X ), which was dependent on the particular input
sequence. For instance, an eight character English password might have 8 hold times and 7
delays for a total of 15 attributes. In this example m = 4 ≈ √15.
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5.3.2 Feature Set
Although we previously investigated using aggregate statistics based on the keystroke hold
times and delays of each input sequence such as averages, standard deviations, etc. in
[12], this work utilizes the raw hold times and delays. In that regard, calculation of the
feature vector for each sequence is arguably as simple as possible; no secondary calculation
is necessary to arrive at the final feature vector. Given the requirement of shift key activity
in the random passwords, it was possible that not every sequence had the same amount of
hold times or delays. In this case, the longest feature vector was identified and all other
sequences (both genuine and imposter) were padded with zeros to arrive at equal length
vectors for each user’s data set.
5.4 Experimental Results
In this section we look into three areas of interest; the performance of our keystroke dynamics
system, the potential relationship between credential component familiarity and authenti-
cation results, and the credential hardening effect of applying keystroke dynamics to tradi-
tional username / password systems. We first demonstrate the performance of our keystroke
dynamics system while varying the nature of algorithmic deployment and the input require-
ments in terms of credential components. First, to reiterate the behavioral nature of the
system, genuine and imposter sequences were collected for each user in the system. Based
on both types of sequences, 19 Random Forests were constructed for each user by varying
the voting percentage required for classification. By doing so, we were able to calculate
ROC curves and EER’s for each user. Figure 5.3 shows the overall system ROC curves
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considering different credential components as input. These ROC curves were calculated by
globally applying a Random Forest voting threshold to each user’s dataset and averaging
FAR and GAR’s across the 41 users. In the figure, plot (a) shows the three curves which
result from considering only single credential components. In other words, only the hold
times and delays for the username, English password, or random password were used for
model creation and testing. Plot (b) shows the results when hold times and delays for both
the username and password components of the credential sets were used. As can be seen
in (a), the English password outperforms the random password for most areas of the ROC
curve while the username universally outperforms both passwords. This figure supports the
hypothesis that performance is driven in part by familiarity of the credential set component
used for authentication. In plot (b), there are select regions of the ROC curve where the
addition of the Random password to the username increases performance over using the
username alone. However, in most regions sole use of the username results in as good, if not
better performance, compared to the the combination of both components of the credential
set. Taking a more fine grained look into the results, Figure 5.4 displays the EER’s for each
of the 41 users in the study considering the same sets of credential components. Here we see
the upper and lower bounds of the system’s performance. The worst performing user for the
English password and username is user #14 having EER’s of 11.36% and 3.4% respectively.
User #21 has the worst random password performance with an EER of 18.22%. Approxi-
mately 25% of the users tested (10/41 ) achieve a 0% EER for usernames while 4 achieve
this rate in English passwords. The lower bound for performance on random passwords is
0.96% corresponding to user #8. If username and password components are combined, we
find the maximum EER’s for both types of passwords improves substantially falling below
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Figure 5.3: System ROC curves considering different credential set input components.
5%. Here user #21 has an EER of 4.4% for English passwords and user #43 has an EER
of 3.9%. Additionally, more users achieve an EER of 0% with 23/41 for the combination
of username and English password and 20/41 for username and random passwords. As
demonstrated earlier in Figure 5.3, system wide performance can be generalized by applying
a global voting threshold across all users. Optionally, one may choose to apply user specific
voting schemes to optimize performance. Table 5.2 shows the difference in performance of
applying global voting schemes vs. user specific voting schemes across the different compo-
nents of the credential sets. Naturally, if system wide performance is characterized using
voting schemes optimized to each user, error rates decrease. This notion is characterized
by the last column in the table indicating the decrease in EER achieved from applying the
global voting threshold to applying the user specific voting schemes. Once again, we see the
trend that credential set components that are more familiar to users perform better. Here,
usernames outperform both the English passwords and random passwords when only one
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of EERs across users considering different credential set input compo-
nents.
Table 5.2: System performance using global and user specific voting schemes.
Credential Set Component(s) EER Global Scheme EER User Specific Scheme Difference
Random Password 6.796% 5.507% 1.289%
English Password 4.578% 3.997% 0.581%
Username 1.511% 1.284% 0.226%
Username + Random Password 4.581% 1.173% 3.408%
Username + English Password 3.138% 0.852% 2.286%
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component is considered. Furthermore, incorporating both the username and English pass-
word yields the best performance result when looking at the user specific EER of 0.852%. In
one final examination of the notion of familiarity, we look into the genuine keystroke profiles
for one user over the three individual components tested: the username, English password,
and random password. Intuitively, we would expect to see less variability from sequence to
sequence in components a user is more familiar than in those a user is less familiar with.
Although space prohibits examining the profiles of every user for each sequence, Figure 5.5
shows the first 40 sequence profiles for user #17 ’s username, English password, and random
password. In the three plots, keystrokes are defined by pairs of circles with matching colors.
Here, open circles indicate a key down and filled circles correspond to the matching key up.
Therefore, the time between the open circle and closed circle of the same color represents
the hold time. The time between two open circles represents the delay between two adjacent
keystrokes. For clarity, the typed input corresponding to the first sequence is labeled in each
plot with *’s indicating a shift key was pressed. Not surprisingly, we see a greater deviation
in the profile of each sequence in the random passwords than we do in the username and
English password sequences. This is potentially a reason for the difference in performances
seen in 5.2. Should the first letter of each portion of the username not been capitalized, even
less inter-sequence variation may have been found in the usernames, shown in plot (a).
To conclude the analysis of the results, we demonstrate the credential hardening effect
of applying our keystroke dynamics system to a classic username / password authentication
system. To do so, we assume that imposters attempting unauthorized entry have obtained
the password of the user in which they are imposing. Based on this assumption, the FAR
or penetration rate of the imposter, in absence of keystroke dynamics, will be 100%. In
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Figure 5.5: The first 40 genuine input sequences of user #17 for username, English password,
and Random password components.
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other words, if the imposter knows the targeted users credentials he / she will always be able
to type them in correctly, thereby gaining access. On the other hand, when our keystroke
dynamics biometric is used to augment the system, correct content of the password is only
a partial requirement; the imposter must also type the credentials with the same keystroke
dynamics signature. Table 5.3 demonstrates the effect of this additional requirement assum-
ing operation at performance rates derived through global application of Random Forests
voting schemes across all users.
Table 5.3: Credential Hardening Effect with Globally Applied Voting Schemes.
FAR(%) FRR(%)
Credential Set Component(s) Before After Difference Before After Difference
Random Password 100.00 6.80 ↓ 93.20 0.00 6.80 ↑ 6.80
English Password 100.00 4.58 ↓ 95.42 0.00 4.58 ↑ 4.58
Username 100.00 1.51 ↓ 98.49 0.00 1.51 ↑ 1.51
Username + Random Password 100.00 4.58 ↓ 95.42 0.00 4.58 ↑ 4.58
Username + English Password 100.00 3.14 ↓ 96.86 0.00 3.14 ↑ 3.14
The penetration rate into the system in terms of FAR decreases by 93.2%, 95.4%, and
98.49% respectively for random passwords, English passwords, and usernames taken as sin-
gleton components. These rates are calculated by simply subtracting the keystroke dynamics
FAR from the assumed 100% penetration without the biometric augment. The higher secu-
rity comes at a relatively low price as the associated increases in FRR are 6.8%, 4.58%, and
1.51% in random passwords, English passwords, and usernames. By applying user specific
voting schemes we can achieve a greater credential hardening effect through the addition
of the keystroke dynamics augment. Table 5.4 shows the decrease in system penetration in
this case. Here, we see greater decreases in system penetration while also decreasing user
inconvenience in terms of the FAR. Additionally, the improvement from applying keystroke
dynamics on the username taken alone or combined with either type of password approaches
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the limits of performance with rates of penetration falling at 1.28%, 1.17%, and 0.85% re-
spectively. Similar to the globally applied voting schemes, this comes at an arguably low
cost to user convenience.
Table 5.4: Credential Hardening Effect with User Specific Voting Schemes.
FAR(%) FRR(%)
Credential Set Component(s) Before After Difference Before After Difference
Random Password 100.00 5.51 ↓ 94.49 0.00 5.51 ↑ 5.51
English Password 100.00 4.00 ↓ 96.00 0.00 4.00 ↑ 4.00
Username 100.00 1.28 ↓ 98.72 0.00 1.28 ↑ 1.28
Username + Random Password 100.00 1.17 ↓ 98.83 0.00 1.17 ↑ 1.17
Username + English Password 100.00 0.85 ↓ 99.15 0.00 0.85 ↑ 0.85
5.5 Discussion
Despite the continuing maturity of the field, many open problems remain with keystroke
dynamics and credential hardening systems. This work does not claim to answer issues
such as rigid model training requirements of operational environments, imposter mimicry,
or generation of imposter data sequences. Regarding issues specifically visited in this work,
a number of assumptions may need further explanation. Since two individual components
of the credential sets considered required shift-key behavior to modify characters, each ex-
tracted feature vector consisting of hold times and delays need not have the same number
of attributes as every other vector in a data set. As mentioned earlier, each sequence was
back filled with zeros to ensure that the extracted feature vector for each sequence had the
same length. Some may argue that this requires posteriori knowledge of the data, namely,
the maximum length feature vector of all sequences in a data set. We would argue however,
that this knowledge is superficial as a maximum keystroke limit per credential set component
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could be imposed without having ill effect on the user’s experience or the performance of the
classification algorithm. To justify the latter, the Random Forest algorithm will automati-
cally weed out attributes with little information gain (zero-valued for virtually all instances)
during decision tree generation.
Although this study admittedly does not consider user mimicry, we do emphasize that
imposter keystroke “attacks” are considered “zero-effort” in that users were asked to type
imposter data naturally. In other words, imposters made no effort to deviate from their
normal typing patterns in an effort to more reliably emulate the targeted genuine sequence
input. Similar to forgery in handwritten signatures, we assume that formal attempts beyond
“zero-effort” attacks may result in decreases credential hardening effects. This notion was
not considered primarily based on the fact that it would be prohibitively difficult to do
so given the completely remote and unsupervised nature of the data collection effort. We
feel the importance of these characteristics coupled with the increased size of the data set
outweigh the importance of gathering data incorporating mimicry.
Even though the results presented in this work support the hypothesis that user famil-
iarity with credential set components may drive keystroke dynamics performance, statistical
tests of sequence uniformity can be applied to further quantify differences in familiarity.
This could be achieved by fitting distributions to individual keystroke hold times and delays
across all genuine sequences of a data set and applying statistical tests of uniformity such as
Rayleigh, Rao, Neyman, etc. Should our hypothesis hold, keystroke hold times and delays
from usernames and English passwords would more closely resemble uniform distributions
than those resulting from random passwords. That said, modification of the username to all
lowercase letters may be necessary.
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Additionally, the authors are aware that although the size of the data sets included in
the work is similar to those found in related academic efforts, the strength of the evidence
supporting the hypotheses presented could be increased through application on larger test
beds. To that regard, continuing data collection efforts are in place to make larger scale
studies possible.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we further established the viability of keystroke dynamics as a method of
hardening traditional username / password credential sets in remote, unsupervised environ-
ments that lack restrictions on hardware use (selection of keyboard), similiar to what one
may expect to find if applied to digitally “signing” evidence as it passes through a chain
of entities. This hardening can be achieved by applying keystroke dynamics to individual
components of a credential set or both simultaneously depending on the nature of the ap-
plication environment and desired performance. Additionally, we investigated the notion
that credential set component familiarity has an affect on keystroke dynamics performance.
Namely, sequences that users are exposed to consistently and arguably familiar with such as
usernames and English words offer better classification potential compared to undoubtedly
unfamiliar sequences such as randomly generated strings. From a realistic application set-
ting, this may be encouraging as despite their relative weakness, most users routinely select
passwords in which they are familiar with such as family names and English words. This
phenomenon may be in part due to more consistent typing signatures in genuine sequences
corresponding to components in which users are more familiar. These conclusions are also
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encouraging as they should prove useful when applied to chain of evidence applications that
will likely use typical username and password credential sets paired with biometrics for the
purposes of user authentication.
This page intentionally contains only this sentence.
Chapter 6
A Conceptual Framework for Digital
Chains of Evidence
As stated in the introduction, the primary goal of this work was to develop a conceptual
framework for creating a digital chain of evidence which allows for validation of evidence
content, transmission, and acquisition source. Referring back to Chapter 2, we see that re-
lated work to this end has primarily identified the problem as opposed to providing solutions.
This chapter describes a conceptual framework which shrinks the gap between the identified
problem and an actual solution. We first offer four different motivating examples of scenarios
where it may be appropriate to maintain a digital chain of evidence. Next, we provide a
high level view of the conceptual framework which establishes the relationship between four
major aspects of a digital chain of evidence including: security service requirements, asso-
ciated security threats, mechanisms for dealing with threats, and subsequent capabilities.
After examining the framework at a high level, we provide 9 use cases which conceptually
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outline how an implementation of the framework would work. Next, we investigate the
success of the framework in offering validation of evidence content, transmission, and ac-
quisition source by presenting a matrix which aligns security service requirements against,
potential threats, mechanisms for countering threats, and subsequent capabilities. Having
established the capabilities, we provide commentary on the agnostic nature of the framework
which offers a desirable degree of flexibility for potential organizations that may use such a
system. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a presentation of a specific instantiation of
the framework based on the application of security mechanisms which have been discussed
in previous chapters of this work.
6.1 Chain of Evidence Scenarios Motivating the Prob-
lem
Before presenting the conceptual framework for a digital chain of evidence, it is beneficial
to further motivate its necessity by providing a number of examples where the framework
could, or perhaps should be applied. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a wide range
of scenarios which could make use of such a framework. In this subsection, we provide four
examples of such scenarios. Figure 6.1 shows the four scenarios provided including: one
example from a typical law enforcement perspective, two dealing with homeland security
operations, and one based on military operations.
The first example is likely the most intuitive example of a scenario where a chain of
evidence is established. Whether dealing with local, state, or federal law enforcement, we
consider the example of crime scene investigation.
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Figure 6.1: Four Scenarios Dealing with Biometric Data Where a Digital Chain of Evidence Could Be Applied.
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In this case, a hypothetical crime has taken place and investigators reach the scene where
the crime occurred. After establishing that no immediate threats remain at the scene,
the investigation begins. As a customary part of such an investigation, members of the
investigation team will typically attempt to collect fingerprints from individuals involved in
committing the crime. For the purposes of the example, we assume prints are discovered
and collected by members of the team. After the on scene investigation is complete, the
team members would typically send lifted prints to a crime lab where the prints would
be converted from physical form to electronic form. After that, the fingerprints might be
submitted to a system such as FBI’s IAFIS which may return a hit against the criminal
database. In this case, police officers would attempt to locate and apprehend the suspect.
After apprehension and arrest, the suspect would be charged, fingerprinted, and placed in
a detention facility. Eventually the case may proceed to trial where the prosecuting team
could provide evidence that the fingerprints lifted from the scene matched those in the IAFIS
database which may lead to the conviction of the defendant. However, in order to get to
that point, we recall the discussion from Chapter 2 which outlined the challenges of those
involved in the United States criminal justice system. Breitman states that “Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, that standard of proof requires only that the party offering an
item of physical evidence introduces such proof as is “sufficient to support” a finding that
the [item in question] is what its proponent claims: Federal Rule of Evidence, 901(a)” [21]
[58]. Additionally, he points out that “the ultimate issues of authentication and condition
are left for the jury. If the proponent’s evidence is facially sufficient to support a finding
of authenticity, then all other issues such as credibility and probability are left for the jury
[21].” Taking these accounts into consideration, the onus of establishing a burden of proof
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in a criminal justice system falls on many shoulders. It is possible that the evidence the
prosecution is relying on has passed through a multitude of entities including crime scene
investigators, lab technicians, evidence clerks, etc. With this in mind, it is the burden of the
prosecution to prove the integrity of the chain of evidence was maintained.
The second example involves homeland security people screening activities which occur
daily at U.S. Port of Entries (POEs). Everyday, thousands of individuals enter the United
States through land, sea, and air POEs. One of the responsibilities of the Department of
Homeland Security is to prevent dangerous people from entering the U.S. Given this goal,
DHS runs programs such as US-VISIT, NEXUS, SENTRI, etc. which keep track of non-
citizens entering the country. Among other information, such systems rely on biometric data
to ensure travelers are not known or suspected terrorists (KSTs) or other individuals who
may be considered dangerous. This example describes how a KST might be apprehended
when attempting to enter the country through a POE supported by US-VISIT. We assume
a KST arrives at a POE and is forced to proceed through a non-citizen lane where he is
subject to US-VISIT processing. At that point, the KST presents a machine readable travel
document (MRTD) to a border inspection officer. Assuming the system is not familiar with
the information in the MRTD (the MRTD hasn’t been seen by the system), a live-scan ten-
print fingerprint submission as well as a digital photograph are collected from the KST. The
border inspection officer submits the fingerprints to the IDENT database through US-VISIT
where the prints are searched against a database of fingerprint of KSTs as well as other
persons of interest. Next, the system registers a likely hit, which triggers both the set of
prints collected at the POE and the prints matched in the database to be transmitted to
latent fingerprint examiners supporting US-VISIT. The latent fingerprint examiners verify
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the match and the result is sent back to the kiosk of the border inspection officer. At
that point, the KST might be taken to secondary screening or apprehended and detained
immediately. From that point on, the KST could be charged and tried in an appropriate court
system for any outstanding crimes committed. In this situation, the evidence has already
traveled across a number of entities and will likely pass through more before it is used in the
appropriate court system. While the court system may or may not be in the United States,
it is safe to assume proving the integrity of the chain of evidence was maintained will be
required in order to admit the digital fingerprints as evidence.
The third example falls outside any criminal justice system and the court of law. Also
dealing with homeland security operations, this example has to do with mass fatality disaster
response. Situations such as natural disasters including hurricanes, floods, etc. often cause
tragedies resulting in mass loss of life. In situations such as these, teams of first responders
arrive at the scene of the disaster and first conduct search and rescue operations in an
attempt save the lives of individuals injured by the disaster. Although, the situations of
the particular disaster will dictate different time frames, the search and rescue operations
eventually turn into search and recover operations where responders attempt to recover the
remains of deceased victims of the disaster such that families can be notified of there loss and
the remains can be lawfully disposed to next of kin. Whether search and rescue or search
and recover, responders in mass fatality disasters are responsible for carefully maintaining
a chain of custody (evidence). According to “Mass Fatality Incidents: A Guide for Human
Forensic Identification,” distributed by The Department of Justice, mass fatality incident
teams can include [106]:
• Medical examiners / coroners
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• Forensic anthropologists
• Odontologists
• Police crime scene investigators
• Forensic photographers
• Evidence technicians
• Scribes / notetakers
The same report outlines a number of requirements that the chain of evidence should doc-
ument. As part of all data collected at such a scene, biometric data of the deceased is
collected which may be used to help establish the identity of the remains. This can include
fingerprints, dental samples, facial photographs, etc. Eventually this information will be
transferred with the remains to the medical examiners / coroners who will attempt to estab-
lish the cause of death and identity of the individuals. Once they have been established the
cause of death, the information is transferred to family assistance centers who locate and
notify next of kin and coordinate the lawful disposition of remains. For obvious reasons,
it is extremely important to provide accurate information to affected family members and
prevent to the greatest degree possible, errors in notification process due to failures of the
chain of evidence. As seen already, the number of entities in this chain may approach double
digits.
The final example we will provide to motivate the problem relates to military / defense
operations. In particular, Expanded Maritime Interception Operations (EMIO) conducted
by the U.S. Navy. In such a scenario, a properly equipped Naval vessel is deployed on
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a visit, board, search, and seizure mission (VSSS). During the operation, the naval vessel
will stop, board, and secure the suspect vessel and use portable biometric devices to collect
biometric data of persons of interest on the suspect vessel. This information is returned to
the EMIO capable naval vessel which subsequently transmits the biometric data back to the
Department of Defense (DOD) Biometric Fusion Center (BFC). The BFC submits the prints
for processing through the Automatic Biometric Identification System (ABIS) which may
return a hit indicating the individual of interest is a KST. These results are relayed back to
the naval EMIO capable vessel who transmits the information wirelessly to the EMIO team
on the suspect vessel. At that point, the EMIO team apprehends the KST and transports
the KST to an appropriate detention facility. Later on, members of agencies such as the
Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) may charge and try the KST in an appropriate
court system. Once again, in order to maximize the possibility of having the evidence viewed
as admissible and authentic, the integrity of the chain of evidence must be maintained. In
this case, the evidence minimally passed through four entities and in all likelihood will be
subject to further analysis before final presentation in court. There are likely many more
examples in which a chain of evidence must be established and maintained that have not
been included in this chapter. However, the four examples presented paint a picture of the
broad applicability and complexity of the problem that is considered in this work. With
this in mind, the following section presents the conceptual framework for establishing and
maintaining a digital chain of evidence in systems dealing with biometric information.
6.2. High Level View of the Framework 111
6.2 High Level View of the Framework
Instead of immediately delving into the application of a framework which describes the spe-
cific use cases of establishing and maintaining a digital chain of evidence, it is useful to
examine the framework from a higher level. This section adopts this approach by consid-
ering the requirements of a chain of evidence, threats which might jeopardize the chain,
mechanisms which can be used to combat the threats, and capabilities which result from
the mechanisms. As mentioned in the introduction it is possible to consider the chain of
evidence problem as a multi-component validation problem broadly including validation of
evidence content, transmission, and acquisition source. However, it is useful to think of this
validation problem in terms of computer security attributes. Computer security attributes
are traditionally broken down into three categories: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Here, confidentiality refers to the concealment of information or services, integrity refers to
trustworthiness of data or resources (sometimes referred to as authenticity), and availability
refers to the ability to use the information or resource provided [114, 17]. While availability
would be an issue for systems establishing and maintaining a digital chain of evidence, it is
outside of the scope of this work. Therefore, we focus only on issues related to confidentiality
and integrity. Each of these three security attributes are then subject to a series of security
threats. While we save the discussion of these specific threats for Section 6.4, it is impor-
tant to note that security mechanisms can be used to combat the threats. In particular,
the conceptual framework utilizes mechanisms described in previous sections of this work
including biometric watermarking, digital hardware fingerprinting, biometric systems, and
cryptography.
1
1
2
C
h
a
p
te
r
6
.
A
C
o
n
c
e
p
tu
a
l
F
ra
m
e
w
o
rk
fo
r
D
ig
ita
l
C
h
a
in
s
o
f
E
v
id
e
n
c
e
a
bc d
e
f b
g
h
bi d f
e
j
k
l
j j
f
e
m
d
j
bn
o
p
q
rs
tuv
w s
x
u
y
z u
x
{
o
p
|
u
r} w
x
~
u


{
x
w } 






Ł




 

   


Ł


   






o
p

w
x
w 
x
u
r s r
t

w  ~
u
x
{
|
~w y 

w 


f b
j
n
h
bi d f
e
j
k
l
j j
f
e
m
d
j
bn f b n d
m
 
bi
j j
¡
¢
£
¤
¥
¦
¤
§
¨
¨
©
©
¤
¨
ª
«
¬
­
®
«
¯
°
j


j
± f¡²
e
g
b
¢
£
¤
¥
¦
¤
¬
³
¨
¬
´
´
³
¨
®
®
¨
´
µ
¶
°
h
bi d f
e
j
k
·
bi

 ¸
e
n ¹n
h
bi d f
e
j
k
º
 ± 
m
e
»
e
j
e
bn
¼
p
½
s
x
w ¾ ~
u
x
{
¿





À


  Á


Ł 
Â





Ã
Ł







Ł 
Ä





Å

Æ





Ł 
Ç

È
 Á 





Ł  Ł

É


Ê


Ë


 


Ì
Ł

È
 

Á

¼
p
ÍÎ ½ q
~ {Ï
x
r ¾ ~ y Ï

{
Ð
p
|
u
r} w
x
~
u

Ñ
y
x
w ~} y ~
Ò u
s ¾
Ó
p
Ô
y ~
v
Õ y ~w
Ö
u
s ¾w ~Ï ~
u
s
x
u
s ¾
¼
p
Í
~w ×w s
x
u
r s r
t

w  ~
u
x
{
|
~w y 

w 

Ø

 
Ù
 Ł
Ì Ì
Ú  

¿
Ø

   Ł
Ù
 Ł
Ì Ì
Ú  

Â
Ø

 
Û
Ł Ê


Ä
Ø
Ù
Ü


  
Ý
  


Ł 
Ç
Ø
Ù
Ü


  
Þ
    Ú

 

Ł 
ß
n b
º
 n bn
à
Ø
Ù
Ü


  


Ł  Ê 
Ë
Ø
Ù
Ü


 


 á
â
 
Ì


á
Ý

 
ã
ä
Ø
Ù
Ü


  
È
å   




Ì
á 


æ
Ø
Ù
Ü


  
ç
   




Ł 
Ù




á

Ù




á
¿
Ù




á
è
é
ê
ëì
í
îï ð
ñ
é
ê
ë ì
í
îï ð
ñ
ò
óô
õ
ö
÷
øù
ù ø
ú
øûüý
ö
þ
ü
ö
ü
ß
   




  

	








  

é
ê
ë ì
í
îï ð
ñ
é
ê
ëì
í
îï ð
ñ
ò
óô
õ
ö
÷
øù
ù ø
ú
øûüý
ö
þ
ü
ö
ü
ß
   




  

	








  

Figure 6.2: High Level View of Framework for Digital Chain of Evidence.
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Finally, through the use of these security mechanisms, one is able to provide security capa-
bilities. These capabilities include the ability to prevent, detect, and recover from security
threats. In the chain of evidence application, we are only concerned with prevention and
detection. The picture comes full circle when we consider that security capabilities meet the
goals of required security services. Figure 6.2 provides a graphical representation of this high
level conceptual framework. Much like the discussion, the graphic ties together the four dif-
ferent security concepts: required security attributes, security threats, security mechanisms,
and security capabilities. Furthermore, it shows how the digital chain of evidence and its
associated use cases sit at the center of these relationships.
6.3 Framework Use Cases
Having a high level understanding of the factors that must be considered in the development
of the conceptual framework, we propose a digital chain of evidence which is composed of
7 different use cases. It is important to note that our proposed conceptual framework does
not contain low level implementation details. Rather, it only provides a level of depth which
should be sufficient for developing specific implementation details. With that in mind, one
could argue for fewer or additional use cases in the framework depending on the depth one is
considering. Fortunately, as we will see in Section 6.5, the level of depth we consider affords
a level of agnosticism and flexibility which is desirable for broad application. The following
subsections provide descriptions of how the 7 different use cases would be carried out should
the framework be applied.
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6.3.1 Use Case Terms
Before examining the different use cases within the proposed framework, it is beneficial to
define terms and acronyms used the in the use case figures. Table 6.1
Term Acronym Definition
Evidence User User A user of the chain of evidence represents any individual
who is capable of generating, viewing, or analyzing evi-
dence. This can include CSI investigators, POE inspection
officers, latent fingerprint examiners, lab technicians, evi-
dence clerks, attorneys, etc.
Evidence Manage-
ment System
EMS The evidence management system is the software system
which would be used to store and maintain evidence. Ev-
idence management systems can be run by federal, state,
or local organizations.
PKI Certificate Au-
thority
PKI CA The PKI Certificate Authority is responsible for managing
public and private key pairs from users of the evidence man-
agement systems as well as evidence management systems
themselves.
Enrollment Re-
quest of a User
ERUSER A request for enrollment either with a PKI CA or an EMS
by the user.
Enrollment Re-
quest of a EMS
EREMS A request for enrollment either with a PKI CA by the EMS.
Credential Set of a
User
CSUSER The credential set of a user. This would potentially in-
clude a username and password. As well as a PKI digital
certificate.
Biometric Signa-
ture of a User
BKUSER The biometric signal of a user which is simply a feature
vector (in binary from). This can potentially come from
any biometric system relying on an arbitrary modality.
Biometric Water-
mark of a User
W(BKUSER) This is used to represent the finished process of watermark-
ing an image with the biometric
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PKI Key Pair of a
User
PKUSER This is represents a typical PKI key pair consisting of a
public key which is openly published and a private key
known only to the user.
PKI Key Pair of an
EMS
PKEMS This is represents a typical PKI key pair consisting of a
public key which is openly published and a private key
known only to the EMS.
Encryption of Data
for an EMS by a
User
E(PKUSER ,PKEMS ) This represents that data has been encrypted using the
PKUSER and PKEMS by the user, for an EMS. In other
words a data object has been encrypted through PKI using
the private key of PKUSER and the public key of PKEMS
.
Decryption of Data
by an EMS from a
User
D(PKUSER ,PKEMS ) This represents that data has been decrypted using the
PKUSER and PKEMS by an EMS, from data encrypted
by a user. In other words a data object has been decrypted
through PKI using the private key of PKEMS and the pub-
lic key of PKUSER .
Sensor ID SID The unique identification number for a biometric sensor /
capture device stored by an EMS.
Sensor Reference
Pattern
SRP The unique noise reference pattern stored by an EMS (gen-
erated during sensor enrollment).
Chain ID CID The unique identification number for a Chain Object stored
by an EMS.
Record ID RID The unique identification number for a Record Object
within a Chain Object.
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Record Object Record Object A Record object is a data structure which contains vari-
ous types of evidence which would be part of a chain of
evidence. Such data would include images from multiple
biometric modalities, sensor information used to capture
images, and any other data relevant to a chain of evidence
(i.e. user names, time of evidence collection, geographic
location of evidence collection, collection notes, etc.).
Chain Object Chain Object A chain object is a data structure which represents a linked
list of record objects. This is the object is used to log
creation, movement, and analysis of evidence (stored in
record objects) throughout the users in a chain of evidence.
Sensor Database Sensor DB A database maintained by an EMS which keeps track of
information on all biometric capture devices fielded by an
organization. Information would include serial numbers,
model numbers, and reference templates used for digital
hardware fingerprinting.
User Database User DB A database maintained by an EMS which keeps track of
information on all users enrolled in the system. This would
include information such credential sets and biometric keys.
Chain Database Chain DB A database maintained by an EMS which keeps track of all
chains of evidence managed by the system.
Authentication Re-
sponse for a User
ARUSER The credential set / biometric authentication response from
the biometric system accesses a User DB stored by an EMS.
Evidence from a
Subject
EVSUB The evidence captured from a live subject or bodily re-
mains. This primarily refers to biometric images.
Validation Re-
sponse
VR The validation response which either verifies a biometric
watermark or a sensors noise residual.
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Integrity Report
from a Chain of
Evience
IRCOE A report automatically generated by an EMS which iter-
atively presents all validation efforts of a Chain Object.
This report is the basis for proving the integrity of a chain
of evidence.
Table 6.1: Terms, Acronyms, and Definitions in the Framework Use Cases
Using the terms and entities described in 6.1, we have developed a framework consisting
of 9 use cases including: user enrollment, sensor enrollment, user login, evidence creation, ev-
idence transmission, evidentiary quality check, evidence storage, evidence request / analysis,
and evidence presentation. These 9 use cases are described in the following subsections.
6.3.2 User / EMS Enrollment
The first use case in the conceptual framework involves the enrollment of the EMS and users
with a PKI Certificate Authority (PKI CA) and the enrollment of users with an EMS. This
process is pictured in Figure 6.3. The process would be initiated from a newly installed EMS
submitting an enrollment request to at PKI CA. After the PKI CA received the request from
the EMS, it would generate and return a PKI pair PKEMS following standard PKI enrollment
procedures. While a discussion of standard PKI procedures is outside the scope of this work,
a summary of such procedures can be found in Appendix B. At this point, users could enroll
into the EMS first by sending an enrollment request to the PKI CA. Once again, the PKI CA
would return a PKI pair PKUSER following standard PKI procedures. Next, the user would
have to enroll with the EMS itself. This would require the user to submit his credential set,
CSUSER and a biometric key BKUSER (consisting of a biometric feature template). At that
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point the EMS would store both CSUSER and BKUSER in the EMS User DB. Note, as seen
in 6.1, CSUSER would include a username, password, and digital certificate. The BKUSER
would be used for two purposes. First, to control access of the user when logging into the
EMS and requesting specific evidence records. Second, to watermark evidence either created
or viewed by the user. In subsequent use cases, we will see how the watermark would serve
as an electronic signature for the user. In principle, any type of biometric could be used for
this process.
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Figure 6.3: User Enrollment Use Case.
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6.3.3 Sensor Enrollment
The next use case involves enrolling sensors or biometric acquisition devices (sensors) in the
EMS sensor database. Figure 6.4 shows a visual depiction of this process. Before a device is
fielded by the organization maintaining the EMS in question, it is first necessary to generate
a reference patter, SRP , which is characterized by the unique noise present in the device.
Much like the experiments in Chapter 4, a series of training images would be collected by the
sensor in the first step. In the next step, noise residuals would be extracted from each of the
training images. The third step would then create a reference pattern for the device using the
noise residuals from each of the training images (perhaps through an averaging operation).
Finally, SRP and relevant information such as the Sensor’s unique ID, SID , would be stored
in the Sensor DB of the EMS in question.
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Figure 6.4: Sensor Enrollment Use Case.
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6.3.4 User Login
The next use case considered involves a user logging into an EMS. Access control to an EMS
should be tightly monitored. With that in mind, it would be prudent to protect authen-
ticate users not only with username and password credential sets, CSUSER , but also with
biometric authentication. The distribution of user credential sets (CSUSER ) and biometric
keys (BKUSER ) was taken care of in the first use case. At this point, the user would provide
CSUSER to the EMS as well as his biometric sample from which his (BKUSER ) would be
extracted. Note this communication, as well as all communication between entities would
be secured by PKI cryptography as outlined in Appendix B. Then, the EMS checks the cre-
dentials and biometric feature templates against the enrolled data in the User DB. Pending
a positive result in the authentication response (ARUSER ), the user would be allowed to
access the system. Figure 6.5 displays this process. In the event of mismatched credentials
or a failure to match the biometric sample provided against the gallery sample, the system
would deny the EMS would deny the user access.
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Figure 6.5: User Login Use Case.
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6.3.5 Evidence Creation
Perhaps one of the most important use cases is that of evidence creation. This takes place
when the first user in a chain of evidence prepares evidence to be submitted to an EMS.
After collecting some form of biometric data and other relevant information from a subject
(EVSUB ), the user submits a biometric sample from which his BKUSER is extracted (by the
user’s EMS interface). This BKUSER is then used to watermark the biometric data creating
W(BKUSER). At that point, the watermarked biometric data and other relevant information
including the sensor information would be bundled into a Record Object and subsequently
packaged into a new Chain Object. Note, space has been allocated for the storage of other
relevant data which might include names, organizations, discovery dates, etc. However, this
work does not focus on dealing with this type of textual data. Finally the chain object would
be encrypted using the PKI pairs of the user and the EMS. After this process is complete, the
encrypted Chain Object would be ready for submission to the EMS. This process is depicted
in Figure 6.6. Note this process would not need to create a new Chain Object every time.
Rather the use case would also apply to the creation of new Record Objects to be added to
existing Chain Objects.
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Figure 6.6: Chain of Evidence Creation Use Case.
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6.3.6 Evidence Transmission
The process of evidence transmission is not unlike transmission of any other data across a
network in that an evidence object (new Chain or Record object) would be sent from a user to
an EMS. However, the important second step in the evidence transmission process would be
to verify that the evidence was not altered during transmission. Aside from typical internet
package transmission protocols, an additional check would be applied by using techniques
from PKI cryptography as outlined in Appendix B. In this case, mismatched file hashes
would indicate a change in the payload. This procedure is depicted in Figure 6.7.
6
.3
.
F
ra
m
e
w
o
rk
U
se
C
a
se
s
1
2
7
º
»
¼
½
¾
¿
À ÁÂ À
Ã
Ä Å ÁÆ Ç
¾
Æ Æ
¾
È Á
É
Ê
Ë
Ì
Í
ÎÏ ÐÏ ÎÑ
Í
Ò
ÓÔ ÕÏ Ñ ÓÑ
Ö
×Ø
Ò
Ó Ô
ÎÙ
ÒÚ
Î Ó ÐÎ
Û
ÜÝ ÎÏ
Þ
Ý Ý Ü
ß
à
Ò
Ý Ý
Ò
ÕÓ
Ò
Ý Ý Î Ó
Í
Í
Õ
Í
á
Î Ñ â âÏ Õ âÏ
Ò
Ñ
Í
Î
ã
Ù
ÒÚ
Î Ó ÐÎ
ä
Ñ ÓÑ Ô Î à Î Ó
Í
å
× Ý
Í
Î à
æ
ã ä å
ç
Ê
è
Ê
ã
Ù
ÒÚ
Î Ó ÐÎ
ä
Ñ ÓÑ Ô Î à Î Ó
Í
å
× Ý
Í
Î à
Ù ÎÏ
Ò Ì Ò
Î Ý
éêë
ÐÎÏ
Í
Ò Ì Ò
ÐÑ
Í
Î
Û
Ì Ò Ö
Î
á
Ñ Ý
á
Î Ý
Û
Ñ Ó
Ú
Ý
Í
ÕÏ Î Ý
Ò
Ó
Í
á
Î
ã ä å
Ý Ü
ß
à
Ò
Ý Ý
Ò
ÕÓ
Ú
Ñ
Í
Ñ
ß
Ñ Ý Î
Ê
ì
íîï
ð
ñ
òó
ô
õö÷
ø
ð
ñ
òó
ô
õö÷
ø
ù
úû
ü
ý
þ
ß 
  ß

ß  
ý


ý


ñ
ó
ô
õö÷

ó
	 

ø

 í

  


ð
ñ
òó
ô
õö ÷
ø
ð
ñ
òó
ô
õö ÷
ø
ù
úû
ü
ý
þ
ß 
  ß

ß  
ý


ý


ñ
ó
ô
õö ÷

ó
	 

ø

  


ff
fi
 
fl
ffi

 
!
"

ff
fi
 
fl
ù
úû
ü
ý
þ
ß 
  ß

ß  
ý


ý


ñ
ó
ô
õö ÷

ó
	 

ø

  


ff
fi
 
fl
ð
ñ
òó
ô
õ ö÷
ø
#
$
%&
î '( î
)
 ' *î +î '
,
-
. í
,
î +
#
$
%&
î '( î
)
 ' *î +î '
,
-
. í
,
î +

  


ff
fi
 
fl
Figure 6.7: Evidence Transmission Use Case.
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6.3.7 Evidentiary Quality Check
The process of an evidentiary quality check is arguably the most important use case in a
digital chain of evidence. The evidentiary quality check allows an individual to detect if
the integrity of a chain of evidence has been compromised. The nature of this process is
somewhat diverse in that it can be used to verify the integrity of newly acquired evidence or
the entire evidence Chain Object itself. With that in mind, there are two different operations.
These operations are pictured in Figure 6.8. The first would occur when an EMS receives
new evidence from a user. This evidence can either take the form of a new Chain Object or a
new Record Object to be added to a Chain Object. Before storing the information, the EMS
must ensure the integrity of the new evidence thereby preventing alterations, fabrications,
etc. To do so, the object would first be decrypted by the EMS using the PKI key pairs
of the EMS and the user who submitted the evidence. This is represented by the notation
D(PKUSER ,PKEMS ). Afterwards, the watermarked biometric data would be decoded. This
process would produce the extracted watermark, BKUSER , and the reconstructed biometric
data. The EMS would then verify the match of the BKUSER to the gallery template of the
user within the biometric authentication system. Should the watermark and the gallery
template match, this would indicate that the user appropriately signed the evidence. While
this is also determined through successful decryption, biometric watermarking adds another
layer of certainty beyond cryptographic means. This is because the biometric watermark
remains after decryption providing evidence of integrity in unencrypted data. Finally, the
source of the biometric evidence could also be verified by extracting noise residuals from the
biometric data and comparing the residual to the SRP in the EMS Sensor database. This
provides a means another means for verifying the source of the data. Additionally, it is
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conceivable that the other relevant data may be vetted against records stored about the
user by the EMS. However, this information would be EMS specific and is outside the scope
of discussion in this conceptual framework. Should these processes return positive results,
found in VR, the evidentiary quality check would be considered a success, records of the
check could be stored in the Chain DB, and the newly submitted evidence would be stored
by the EMS as submitted by the user.
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Figure 6.8: Evidentiary Quality Check Use Case.
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As mentioned, an evidentiary quality check could verify the integrity of a new record
within a chain, or establish the integrity of the entire chain object prior to presentation
in a legal system. The latter case is simply an iterative version of the first case. Here,
the same process as described in the previous paragraph would be applied iteratively from
the first Record Object in the Chain Object through the last Record Object in the linked
list of Record Objects making up the Chain Object. This would allow for the generation
of a report, IRCOE , verifying the integrity of the chain from start to finish. IRCOE would
encompass all previously mentioned validation processes including: transmission validation,
content validation, and source validation. Such a report could be provided to a prosecutorial
team, a judge, or other pertinent individuals.
6.3.8 Evidence Storage
While evidence could potentially be stored separately by any user within the chain or system
outside the EMS, we are only concerned about storage of evidence that can be authenticated
within the EMS system. With that in mind, Figure 6.9 shows the procedure for storing
evidence in the Chain DB of an EMS. Once an EMS receives new evidence from a user
(either a new Chain Object or a new Record Object to be added to a pre-existing chain)
the system would perform an evidentiary quality check as outlined in the previous use case.
Should the new evidence fail to meet the evidentiary quality check, EMS specific business
rules could be applied to determine how best to deal with the situation. Pending a successful
result, the storage process would consist of one of two options. If the evidence is a new Chain
Object, the Object would be stored as such. If the new evidence were a Record Object to
be added to an previously existing chain, the EMS would add the new Record Object to the
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end of the linked list representing the Chain Object. This process would be facilitated by the
fact that the User provides the EMS with CID and RID unique identifiers. It is important
to note that the evidence would be stored in encrypted format using the EMS PKI key pair,
E(PKEMS ).
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Figure 6.9: Evidence Storage Use Case.
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6.3.9 Evidence Request / Analysis
Outside of creating new evidence, one important aspect of the EMS includes allowing entities
within the chain to view, analyze, and potentially create new versions of previously existing
evidence (i.e. quality enhancements). This process would be initiated by a user submitting
a request to an EMS. The request would identify what specific record and chain the user
wished to analyze using a CID and RID . Once the EMS receives the request, it would initiate
a biometric authentication process. This biometric authentication process would provide a
level of data access control which could be implemented at arbitrary levels of granularity
with any type of data level access control mechanism (access control lists, matrices, etc.).
Pending successful authentication (contained in ARUSER ), the requested evidence would be
encrypted for the user using the key pairs of the user and the EMS, E(PKUSER ,PKEMS ).
At that point the evidence would be transmitted to the user where he could perform the
necessary operations. After completing those operations (which may include creation of new
evidence), the evidence transmission, evidentiary quality check, and evidence storage use
cases would be repeated to record the transactions in the evidence chain object. This use
case is shown visually in Figure 6.10.
6
.3
.
F
ra
m
e
w
o
rk
U
se
C
a
se
s
1
3
5
%
&
'
(
)
*
+ ,- +
.
+ /
0
+ 1
2
3
4
,5
6
7
1
)
1
8
9
:
;< =
> >
?
@
A B?< < ?C A ? B
D
B
D
=E ; E
>
FG ?
< ?H =<
@
I
B
J
K
L
D
M L
; ?N
L @
? ; H ? BA
O
P
L
B B
L
=;
9
Q
B?< BE H H ? B B
D
=< ?H =<
@ O L
=P ?
D
<
L
H E
> >
F
N ?<
LR L
?
@ O
F
:S T
9
U
? ;
@ L
;V < ? BA
>
D
W
< ? H =<
@
R
?
D
H
M
?
@ O
F
:S T
E ;
@
? ; H < FX
D
?
@
A B
L
;V
UY
Z [\]
E ;
@
UY
\^ [
_
9
:
N
L @
? ; H ? < ?H =<
@
D
< E ; BP
L
D D
?
@
D
=
A B?<
R
=< E ; E
>
F B
L
B
9
`
R
D
?< E ; E
>
F B
L
B
W
?N
L @
? ; H ? H < ? E
D
L
=;
W
D
< E ; BP
L
B B
L
=;
?N
L @
? ;
D
L
E < F C A E
> L
D
F H
M
?H
a
W
E ;
@
?N
L @
? ; H ? B
D
=< E V ? A B? H E B? B K =A
> @ O
?
< ? X ? E
D
?
@
9
b
cd e
f
gh
i
j
k
lm
m l
n
lop q
j
r
p
j
p
s
t
u v
w
x yz
{
u v
|} ~







f
g h
i
j
k
lm
m l
n
l op q
j
r
p
j
p
s
t
u v
w
x yz
{
u v
|} ~

Y
Z
Ł



d  d

  d d 


 c

d 
b
cd e

 


w
x y z
 f
w
x y z
Y
Z
 Ł
 f
w
x y z

 ¡
W
¢
 ¡

 ¡
W
¢
 ¡
Figure 6.10: Evidence Request / Analysis Use Case.
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6.3.10 Evidence Presentation
The final use case is the simplest operation within the conceptual framework. It involves
presentation of the evidence stored in a chain object as well as presentation of the integrity
of the chain object itself. As outlined in the evidentiary quality check use case, the last
operation involves the dissemination of the evidence in an appropriate court system or as a
final check before delivering news to next of kin in a mass fatality disaster incident. Here, the
onus is to establish that the integrity of the chain of evidence has been maintained thereby
preventing alterations, fabrications, false repudiations, etc. Referring back to the evidentiary
quality check use case, the conceptual EMS is capable of generating a report, IRCOE , which
verifies the aspects of integrity mentioned above. This report could be reviewed by the
last individual prior to disseminating news to disaster victim next of kin or presented in
the relevant court system by prosecutors with the help of an expert witness capable of
authoritatively explaining the processes of the EMS. At that point, the integrity of the chain
would not likely be in question. This process is pictured in 6.11
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Figure 6.11: Evidence Presentation Use Case.
138 Chapter 6. A Conceptual Framework for Digital Chains of Evidence
6.4 Chain of Evidence Trustworthiness: Attributes, Threats,
Mechanisms, and Capabilities
As pictured in in Figure 6.2, the conceptual framework deals with four main aspects of com-
puter security: attribute requirements, threats, mechanisms, and capabilities. While aspects
of these issues have already been discussed in previous sections, the purpose of this section
is to provide a structured discussion of how the proposed mechanisms deal with specific
threats, thereby providing capabilities which meet the requirements of the digital chain of
evidence. Figure 6.12 concisely summarizes this relationship. Before delving into specific
threats, mechanisms for countering threats, and associated capabilities, it is important to
reiterate the concept note the depth of this analysis. Given the conceptual nature of the
proposed framework, it does not include matters such as specific implementation details,
rather it provides notional concepts. With this in mind, it is not appropriate to vet the con-
ceptual framework against vulnerabilities at the level of a US-CERT maintained database.
Rather, the framework should be vetted against security threats at an appropriate level of
depth. With that in mind, we consider the proposed framework’s ability to address concep-
tual notions of six security threats related to the service requirements of confidentiality and
integrity. In the first row of the figure, chain of evidence security attribute requirements are
presented in terms of generalized computer security requirements: confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. As mentioned in Section 6.2, for the purposes of this work, we are only
concerned with confidentiality and availability. While availability should not be ignored,
we are not aware of any special circumstances that are specific to the chain of evidence, as
opposed to a generic trusted computing application.
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Figure 6.12: Security Service Requirements, Threats, Mechanisms, and Capabilities.
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Therefore, this aspect of the chain could be ensured through normal information technology
mechanisms for achieving availability such as employing appropriate firewall, redundancy,
and backup systems.
6.4.1 Confidentiality
We first consider the notion of confidentiality. As previously mentioned, confidentiality
refers to the concealment of information or services. Specific security threats related to
confidentiality include unauthorized access to software systems or data and interception of
data as pictured in second and third columns of the second row of Figure 6.12.
Unauthorized User Access (Software / Data)
Through the applications of credential management and particularly biometric systems, we
provide the ability to reasonably prevent unauthorized user access to software and data. As
mentioned in the User Login and the Evidence Request use cases, access to the software
system is protected by biometric authentication as is access to individual components of
chain of evidence data. While no biometric system is perfect, the combination of credential
management and biometric authentication is arguably the best mix of security and conve-
nience available at a reasonable price today in network systems. It would also be possible
to detect the unauthorized user access to data through the security mechanism of biometric
watermarking. As biometric watermarking is used as a means of ”signing” for evidence, the
lack of, or presence of an incorrect biometric watermark would indicate that an unauthorized
user has provided that evidence.
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Data Interception
The other security threat related to confidentiality considered in this analysis is the threat
of data interception. While it is nearly impossible to prevent all means of intercepting data
in a network environment, cryptographic approaches can be used to make the effects of risk
of data interception minimal. By that, it would be theoretically possible for an outsider
to intercept data being transmitted to or from an EMS. Yet without appropriate access to
cryptographic key pairs, the intercepted data would be of no use to the outsider. Similar
to the notion of availability, it would be possible to implement virtual private networks and
other mechanisms that would minimize the likelihood of this threat being realized. Once
again, PKI protocols are described in Appendix B.
6.4.2 Integrity
The most important security service related to systems maintaining digital chains of evidence
is integrity. By that, we wish to ensure that data has not be inappropriately altered or
modified, fabricated, etc. There are four major security threats related to integrity: data
modification, data fabrication, repudiation of origin, and denial of receipt.
Data Modification
In a data modification threat, previously existing data is altered either by someone within the
chain of evidence or someone outside the chain. Note, this modification can be intentional or
unintentional. The first mechanism for ensuring that data is not altered involves the appli-
cation of cryptography and hashing functions. Using established techniques, one can easily
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determine that data has been modified. One indication that data has been modified would
be that decryption processes fail. Once again, whether the modification was intentional or
unintentional is not relevant. If a package is correctly encrypted and transmitted it, the
homomorphic nature of the decryption process result in a readable result and failure could
indicate a modification. Additionally, while cryptography couldn’t prevent the modification
of data, it can be used to prevent the meaningful modification of data by an individual with
malicious intent. While this is one mechanism, the classic mechanism for detecting changes
in data involves file hashing. Here a file (or potentially a chain or record object) is passed
through a hashing algorithm (i.e. SHA-2) which generates a unique, fixed length string based
on the contents of the file. In theory, modifying so much as one bit in the file should change
the output of the hash function. Therefore it would be possible to detect any modification
by comparing the hash strings.
The next way to detect data modification is through biometric watermarking. In a
biometric system, the inability to correctly extract the expected biometric watermark either
indicates the host data was either not watermarked in the first place, or the the data has
been modified outside of the appropriate usage of the system. Once again, this may entail an
intentional act on the part of an individual with malicious intent or it could be an innocent
but important mistake on the part of an authorized user. Either way, such a modification is
important in the scope of digital chains of evidence and biometric watermarking would be
capable of detection.
The final mechanism presented in the framework for detecting modification of data is
hardware fingerprinting. Keeping in mind the importance of establishing the source of data,
digital hardware fingerprinting is capable of detecting modifications of an image because
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many modifications will alter the noise residual associated with an image. Although elements
of this application were not specifically presented in this study, works such those seen in [26]
have established this possibility. It should be noted that this would not necessarily apply
to all possible modifications a biometric image may be subject to. In other words, it may
be possible to modify an image in such a way that the associated noise residual is not
significantly affected such that is results in a failure to match the sensors reference template.
Data Fabrication
The threat of data fabrication is essentially the same as data modification. The main differ-
ence is that fabrication entails creation of evidence instead of modifying previously existing
evidence. With that in mind, the same security mechanisms and principles applied in the
previous subsection can be used to prevent and detect data fabrication attempts. However,
it is important to note the special consideration of this threat as it relates to the digital
chain of evidence. Whether from an outsider or individual authorized to use contribute to
an evidence chain, the notion of planting evidence is highly important. This may be viewed
as the principle application of digital hardware fingerprinting. It is conceivable to think
someone may fraudulently plant previously acquired electronic fingerprint to frame another
individual. That said, if the noise residual of the fingerprints cannot be tracked back to
the capture device used at the point of acquisition, it would be indicative of an attempt at
fabrication or forgery.
144 Chapter 6. A Conceptual Framework for Digital Chains of Evidence
Repudiation of Origin
The next security threat related to the security service of integrity is repudiation of origin.
In such a case, an individual denies that he sent or in the case of a digital chain of evidence,
created data. Related to the the previous threats of data modification and fabrication, it is
extremely important to log who handles and creates evidence. It is conceivable to imagine
a case relating to a digital chain of evidence where an individual would falsely deny having
handled or created evidence. However, through the application of cryptography and hashing
as well as biometric watermarking it would be feasible to detect false repudiations. Both PKI
cryptography and biometric watermarking are proposed as means to “digitally sign” evidence
within the framework. The former obviously involves cryptographic processes, the latter
takes place outside of encryption. In order for evidence to be watermarked and “digitally
signed” by the EMS, the creating user must submit his or her biometric sample. This means
it would be extremely difficult to make a case for repudiation of origin. Effectively, someone
would have had to acquire and implant the biometric evidence of the user in question which
is highly unlikely. Additionally, it is widely known that one can combat repudiation of origin
through appropriate use of PKI key pairs. Therefore, if the watermarking and cryptography
processes check out, in all likelihood, repudiation of origin is not a feasible defense for the
user in question.
Denial of Receipt
The last security threat considered in this work is denial of receipt. Similar to repudiation of
origin, here an individual or system falsely proclaims that he did not receive data, or in this
case, evidence. Classic applications of PKI cryptography as seen in [17, 114] can be used to
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prevent and detect this threat.
6.4.3 Availability
To reiterate, the security threats related to the security service of availability are not con-
sidered relevant for the purpose of this work. Therefore, analysis does not apply.
6.5 Agnostic Nature of the Framework Components
One of the reasons for proposing a conceptual framework is that it allows for a high degree of
flexibility and agnosticism with respect to the choice of specific security mechanisms applied.
Although we propose a specific instantiation of the framework in the following section, the
conceptual framework does not rely on any specific biometric authentication, cryptographic,
biometric watermarking, or hardware fingerprinting system implementation. For example,
face recognition could be used just as easily as iris recognition could be for dealing with
access control issues. An amplitude modulation approach to biometric watermarking could
be adapted just as easily as an approach operating outside the spatial domain. If one would
prefer to apply a hardware fingerprinting approach which identifies devices based on fixed
pattern noise (FPN) or any other method picture in Figure 6.13 instead of photo-response
non-uniformity noise (PRNU), this is perfectly acceptable. This flexibility is desirable for a
number of reasons. First of all, there are inevitably preferences, if not fervent disagreements
regarding the choice of technology among the various organizations who could employ evi-
dence management systems. If a the framework were not sufficiently flexible, such that it
could adapt to such preferences, the benefit the research would be significantly less broad.
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Secondly, the ideas behind the proposed framework can be sustained as technology and re-
search evolves. If a new biometric emerges that outperforms all other currently existing
biometrics, there is no immediate reason why this biometric could not be substituted for
what is currently in place. The same argument can be made for all other security mech-
anisms provided. Finally, the purpose of this work is not to provide a deployment ready
system. Rather this work aims to shrink the gap between currently existing methods for
maintaining paper based chains and the development of digital chains of evidence capable
of greater levels of authentication.
6
.5
.
A
g
n
o
stic
N
a
tu
re
o
f
th
e
F
ra
m
e
w
o
rk
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
ts
1
4
7
Digital Hardware Fingerprinting
Feature Noise Patterns 
Inherent to 
Sensors
Fixed Pattern 
Noise (FPN)
Photo-Response 
Nonuniformity
Noise (PRNU)
Lens Distortions, 
Dust, etc.
Method of 
Measurement
Evaluation Board 
Testing
Flat Fielding
Scenery 
Suppression via 
Denoising
Time Series 
Imagery 
Differences
Compensation 
algorithm 
parameter 
modeling
Light Box
Astronomical 
(Dark)
Wavelet Based
Others (Wiener, 
Median,NL Means)
Classification
Correlation, Distance, 
etc.
Machine Learning
=  Path 
Investigated in 
this work
Figure 6.13: Approaches to Digital Hardware Fingerprinting.
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6.6 Instantiation of the Framework through Specific
Security Mechanisms
Although there is a number of reasons to stop at the conceptual framework proposed thus
far, it is beneficial propose one more layer of depth by providing an example instantiation
of the framework relying on specific topics studied in previous chapters of this work. The
remainder of this section breaks down the instantiation by the four security mechanisms
involved.
6.6.1 Biometric Systems
The biometrics are responsible for two operations within the proposed framework. First,
they are used to control access to the software system and specific objects of evidence such
as chains and records within chains. Second, they are a component of the biometric water-
marking system the watermarking system which is used to “sign” evidence. Taking this into
consideration, there may be one biometric system which controls access and another which
is used for watermarking. Given that most software systems already maintain username and
password credential sets, we believe it would be appropriate to apply a keystroke dynamics
system similar to that described in Chapter 5 to control access to the software system itself.
Beyond that one might wish to apply an online signature based system for allowing access
to specific evidence and generating biometric watermarks. This would be a direct similarity
to currently existing paper based chains where evidence is physically signed for. However,
the process of penning a signature may be costly in terms of acquisition time in certain
situations. For instance, it may be appropriate for an inspection officer in a POE secondary
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screening room to provide a biometric watermark generated from facial feature vectors in-
stead of having to physically sign every submission. Therefore the choice of a biometric for
this purpose is truly system specific.
6.6.2 Biometric Watermarking
For the purposes of biometric watermarking we propose to use the amplitude modulation
approaches including the one described in Chapter 3. With the exception of substituting
the biometric watermark to reflect the decision in in the previous section, this algorithm
would be sufficient for watermarking evidence taking the form of iris images such as those
that might be found in a system such NEXUS maintained by DHS. Furthermore, work
such as that presented in [61, 63] have established mechanisms using similar amplitude
modulation schemes to watermark face and fingerprint images. While it is conceivable that
other biometric data would need to be watermarked, there is no immediate reason why such
a scheme couldn’t be modified to handle such cases.
6.6.3 Digital Hardware Fingerprinting
In terms of the digital hardware fingerprinting services, we would suggest using the approach
described in Chapter 4. Having established the prospects of the approach to perform source
validation on biometric fingerprint readers and iris cameras this technique would is now
potentially capable of dealing with sensors which acquire data from three most commonly
collected biometrics. This is the case other works have established the ability of the technique
to identify traditional digital cameras which are commonly used to capture face images [86].
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6.6.4 Cryptography
The choice of cryptographic is not particularly relevant to this section and it would likely be
subject to the organization maintaining the EMS. The only requirement is that it be based
on public key infrastructure with asymmetric public key pairs.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Conclusion
There are many scenarios dealing with biometric identification which require the ability to
establish and maintain a digital chain of evidence. Whether dealing with law enforcement
cases such as those seen in crime scene investigations, people screening activities at POEs,
and expanded maritime interception operations or homeland security responses to mass fa-
tality incident disasters, the ability to establish, maintain, and prove the integrity of a digital
chain of evidence is necessary to avoid undesirable consequences. These consequences can
entail the inability to effectively prosecute known and suspected terrorists and criminals (re-
sulting in their subsequent release), wrongful convictions of innocent people, and errors in
notifying the next of kin of disaster victims. While the proliferation of digital evidence has
brought to bear new challenges in developing these verifiable chains of evidence, advances in
security technologies have afforded greater development opportunities that did not exist in
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years past. Through the application of security mechanisms such as cryptography and hash-
ing, biometric authentication, biometric watermarking, and digital hardware fingerprinting,
this work has proposed a conceptual framework which is capable of providing security capa-
bilities that can detect and prevent threats against the confidentiality and integrity of these
digital chains of evidence. Furthermore, specific contributions to the topics of keystroke dy-
namics, amplitude modulation based biometric watermarking, and hardware fingerprinting
of biometric sensors allow for the instantiation of the developed conceptual framework which
is even closer to the point of direct implementation.
To reiterate, this work provides four main contributions:
1. We developed an iris digital watermarking system which is not only resistant to com-
mon application scenarios such at database compression and partial progressive decod-
ing, but also capable of withstanding the rewatermarking process which might be seen
in the proposed chain of evidence. Our work extended current biometric watermark-
ing techniques by modifying existing approaches to allow for selective encoding in the
region of interest in iris biometric images. Additionally, our approach provides a novel
asymmetric implementation of the watermarking scheme.
2. We demonstrated the ability to perform source validation on biometric modalities
which collect data with capture devices outside of typical photographic cameras. We
applied an approach designed for digital cameras which relies on PRNU noise to a series
of biometric fingerprint readers as well as iris cameras using sensors which respond to
the infrared band of the electromagnetic spectrum.
3. We demonstrated that input stimulus familiarity is a driver of classification perfor-
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mance in keystroke dynamic systems. This observation is should prove to be useful in
selection process of username and password credential sets.
4. We developed a conceptual framework for establishing and maintaining digital chain of
evidence dealing with biometric data which relies on elements of cryptography, biomet-
ric watermarking, digital hardware fingerprinting, and biometric authentication. We
demonstrated how the framework is capable of dealing with security threats associated
with confidentiality and integrity as well as including an example instantiation of the
conceptual framework which makes use of the other contributions of the work.
7.2 Future Work
While this work shrinks the gap between traditional paper-based chains of evidence and im-
plementations of digital chains of evidence with enhanced mechanisms for proving integrity,
there are many more topics that can be investigated to further shrink this gap. In terms of
the proposed framework, there are benefits to its conceptual nature. However, given the level
considered, there are likely to be complicated issues which may arise when specific imple-
mentation details are developed. As the concepts move closer to deployment implementation
details at a greater level of depth will need to be developed. This extended formalization
will also be required to test the framework and associated protocol using methods from
software engineering and information assurance communities. This could also likely involve
developing a pilot system to be run in one of the many potential application environments.
Policy and legal issues must be explored to determine what, if any hurdles, stand in the way
of applying methods such as biometric watermarking and hardware fingerprinting as part of
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maintaining such chains. These mechanisms do alter the data from its original form, however
so to do state of the art image enhancement techniques. While these techniques appear to
be accepted in the court of law, it is necessary to set judicial precedence related to the pro-
posed frameworks for digital chains of evidence. We have also noted that this work does not
specifically look into all the different types of meta-data which may collected about digital
evidence. This type of evidence was labeled as “Other relevant data,” in Chapter 6. More
work could be conducted to research what specific meta-data should be collected, stored,
and presented however we belief this is best suited for individuals with legal expertise.
In the field of digital hardware fingerprinting, similar tests must be run on much larger
datasets which provide a closer reflection of the number of capture devices that may be
fielded by organization maintaining chains of evidence. Furthermore, tests must be run
on other sensors including new ten-print fingerprint scanners and mobile collection devices.
Such devices may require the need to investigate other options for source identification such
as those pictured in Figure 6.13. Additionally, it would also be interesting to look into other
levels of hardware fingerprinting potentially including model, brand, and technology. Finally,
a deeper investigation of both the limitations and potential areas of extension of the chosen
approach would be appropriate.
Related to biometric watermarking, there may be a need to integrate the aspects of
biometric cryptosystems into the watermarking process. Therefore, transformed versions
of biometric feature vectors could be used to watermark biometric host data. Although
we do not believe them to be serious, this may alleviate potential security and privacy
related concerns associated with the proposed implementation. Extending the analysis of
the proposed rewatermarking scheme in terms of the systems degree of fragility would also
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be useful.
While work continues in the field of keystroke dynamics, little work has been done to
establish minimum requirements for training classifiers that differentiate between genuine
and imposter input classes. Furthermore, a topic that has yet to be addressed is methods of
automatically generating input sequences which closely model imposter data.
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Appendix A
Hardware Fingerprinting Confusion
Matrices
A.1 Fingerprint Confusion Matrices
A.1.1 FVC Data
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 510 64 40 23 25 52 58 18
Microelectonic 3 774 2 4 1 0 1 5
Identicator 39 34 616 25 17 26 15 18
Identix 89 83 66 308 56 59 53 76
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 790 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 790 0 0
CrossMatch 1 1 0 0 1 1 782 4
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 790
Table A.1: FVC confusion matrix when training on 1 image per sensor
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 713 4 16 11 12 6 16 2
Microelectonic 0 778 0 1 0 0 0 1
Identicator 16 15 714 9 3 12 5 6
Identix 77 62 53 348 51 64 50 75
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 780 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 780 0 0
CrossMatch 0 1 1 0 2 0 775 1
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 780
Table A.2: FVC confusion matrix when training on 2 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 719 5 4 6 5 7 9 5
Microelectonic 0 760 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identicator 11 0 740 4 0 3 2 0
Identix 57 59 57 361 43 48 48 87
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 760 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 760 0 0
CrossMatch 0 0 0 0 1 0 758 1
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 760
Table A.3: FVC confusion matrix when training on 4 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 688 8 3 7 5 3 4 2
Microelectonic 0 720 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identicator 0 0 720 0 0 0 0 0
Identix 49 46 54 400 37 40 37 57
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 720 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 720 0 0
CrossMatch 0 0 0 0 0 0 720 0
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 720
Table A.4: FVC confusion matrix when training on 8 images per sensor
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 640 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Microelectonic 0 640 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identicator 0 0 640 0 0 0 0 0
Identix 26 44 43 421 19 26 18 43
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 640 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 640 0 0
CrossMatch 0 0 0 0 0 0 640 0
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 640
Table A.5: FVC confusion matrix when training on 16 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 480 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Microelectonic 0 480 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identicator 0 0 480 0 0 0 0 0
Identix 14 18 23 365 14 13 10 28
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 480 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 480 0 0
CrossMatch 0 0 0 0 0 0 480 0
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 480
Table A.6: FVC confusion matrix when training on 32 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified Key- Micro- Identi- Identix Biometrika Precise Cross- Digital-
Tronic electronic cator Match Persona
KeyTronic 160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Microelectonic 0 160 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identicator 0 0 160 0 0 0 0 0
Identix 2 3 3 136 4 4 3 5
Biometrika 0 0 0 0 160 0 0 0
Precise 0 0 0 0 0 160 0 0
CrossMatch 0 0 0 0 0 0 160 0
Digital Persona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 160
Table A.7: FVC confusion matrix when training on 64 images per sensor
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A.1.2 WVU Data
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
BioTouch #1 BioTouch #2 BioTouch #2 Microsoft #1 Microsoft #2 Microsoft #3
BioTouch #1 3942 14 32 1 1 0
BioTouch #2 6 3967 17 0 0 0
BioTouch #3 3 10 3977 0 0 0
Microsoft #1 0 0 0 3989 1 0
Microsoft #2 0 0 0 0 3990 0
Microsoft #3 0 0 0 0 0 3990
Table A.8: WVU confusion matrix when training on 1 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
BioTouch #1 BioTouch #2 BioTouch #2 Microsoft #1 Microsoft #2 Microsoft #3
BioTouch #1 3980 0 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #2 1 3979 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #3 0 0 3980 0 0 0
Microsoft #1 0 0 0 3980 0 0
Microsoft #2 0 0 0 0 3980 0
Microsoft #3 0 0 0 0 0 3980
Table A.9: WVU confusion matrix when training on 2 images per sensor
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
BioTouch #1 BioTouch #2 BioTouch #2 Microsoft #1 Microsoft #2 Microsoft #3
BioTouch #1 3960 0 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #2 0 3960 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #3 0 0 3960 0 0 0
Microsoft #1 0 0 0 3960 0 0
Microsoft #2 0 0 0 0 3960 0
Microsoft #3 0 0 0 0 0 3960
Table A.10: WVU confusion matrix when training on 4 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
BioTouch #1 BioTouch #2 BioTouch #2 Microsoft #1 Microsoft #2 Microsoft #3
BioTouch #1 3920 0 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #2 0 3920 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #3 0 0 3920 0 0 0
Microsoft #1 0 0 0 3920 0 0
Microsoft #2 0 0 0 0 3920 0
Microsoft #3 0 0 0 0 0 3920
Table A.11: WVU confusion matrix when training on 8 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
BioTouch #1 BioTouch #2 BioTouch #2 Microsoft #1 Microsoft #2 Microsoft #3
BioTouch #1 3840 0 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #2 0 3840 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #3 0 0 3840 0 0 0
Microsoft #1 0 0 0 3840 0 0
Microsoft #2 0 0 0 0 3840 0
Microsoft #3 0 0 0 0 0 3840
Table A.12: WVU confusion matrix when training on 16 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
BioTouch #1 BioTouch #2 BioTouch #2 Microsoft #1 Microsoft #2 Microsoft #3
BioTouch #1 3680 0 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #2 0 3680 0 0 0 0
BioTouch #3 0 0 3680 0 0 0
Microsoft #1 0 0 0 3680 0 0
Microsoft #2 0 0 0 0 3680 0
Microsoft #3 0 0 0 0 0 3680
Table A.13: WVU confusion matrix when training on 32 images per sensor
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A.1.3 WVU / Clarkson Data
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 3707 198 213 522 192 168
WVU Secugen 948 1107 494 944 972 535
WVU CrossMatch 1131 763 834 1168 668 436
Clarkson Precise 1056 371 299 2658 315 301
Clarkson Secugen 662 567 259 594 2584 334
Clarkson CrossMatch 576 459 224 721 330 2690
Table A.14: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 1 image per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4216 118 101 386 104 75
WVU Secugen 917 1144 522 923 972 522
WVU CrossMatch 1069 729 937 1075 709 481
Clarkson Precise 904 281 255 3088 226 246
Clarkson Secugen 356 475 203 521 3253 192
Clarkson CrossMatch 499 268 134 338 312 3449
Table A.15: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 2 image per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4559 57 50 261 42 31
WVU Secugen 921 1253 463 911 981 471
WVU CrossMatch 1058 648 1053 1094 730 417
Clarkson Precise 511 152 137 3907 180 113
Clarkson Secugen 268 300 144 293 3820 175
Clarkson CrossMatch 263 112 69 248 199 4109
Table A.16: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 4 image per sensor
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4823 20 20 97 22 18
WVU Secugen 793 1519 440 874 935 439
WVU CrossMatch 967 617 1246 1096 675 399
Clarkson Precise 516 114 81 4088 112 89
Clarkson Secugen 127 219 62 108 4386 98
Clarkson CrossMatch 144 84 21 140 139 4472
Table A.17: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 8 image per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4907 7 6 65 12 3
WVU Secugen 737 1756 365 808 943 391
WVU CrossMatch 908 575 1732 912 581 292
Clarkson Precise 221 35 30 4647 37 30
Clarkson Secugen 73 93 21 75 4695 43
Clarkson CrossMatch 101 46 18 80 84 4671
Table A.18: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 16 image per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4961 4 2 29 3 1
WVU Secugen 639 2150 339 686 881 305
WVU CrossMatch 708 459 2239 804 497 293
Clarkson Precise 138 35 11 4781 16 19
Clarkson Secugen 33 46 21 44 4840 16
Clarkson CrossMatch 57 30 13 29 30 4841
Table A.19: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 32 image per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4981 1 2 14 2 0
WVU Secugen 544 2547 246 605 780 278
WVU CrossMatch 491 333 3058 592 335 191
Clarkson Precise 73 2 2 4913 5 5
Clarkson Secugen 6 29 17 32 4908 8
Clarkson CrossMatch 19 12 1 18 19 4931
Table A.20: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 64 image per sensor
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4979 0 0 21 0 0
WVU Secugen 364 3146 179 492 596 223
WVU CrossMatch 313 188 3781 366 246 106
Clarkson Precise 32 3 0 4963 2 0
Clarkson Secugen 14 25 7 14 4940 0
Clarkson CrossMatch 27 1 2 1 10 4959
Table A.21: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 128 images per sensor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified WVU WVU WVU Clarkson Clarkson Clarkson
Precise Secugen CrossMatch Precise Secugen CrossMatch
WVU Precise 4990 1 0 9 0 0
WVU Secugen 233 3943 93 261 360 110
WVU CrossMatch 93 58 4579 144 101 25
Clarkson Precise 12 0 0 4988 0 0
Clarkson Secugen 2 15 4 10 4969 0
Clarkson CrossMatch 5 1 0 0 7 4987
Table A.22: WVU / Clarkson confusion matrix when training on 256 images per sensor
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A.2 Iris Confusion Matrices
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1895 26 33 36
CASIA OKI 0 1990 0 0
WVU OKI 36 38 1901 15
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1990
Table A.23: Iris confusion matrix when training on 1 images per camera
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1954 26 33 36
CASIA OKI 0 1980 0 0
WVU OKI 21 32 1919 8
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1980
Table A.24: Iris confusion matrix when training on 2 images per camera
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1951 8 1 0
CASIA OKI 0 1960 0 0
WVU OKI 20 13 1926 1
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1960
Table A.25: Iris confusion matrix when training on 4 images per camera
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1918 2 0 0
CASIA OKI 0 1920 0 0
WVU OKI 9 10 1900 1
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1920
Table A.26: Iris confusion matrix when training on 8 images per camera
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1838 2 0 0
CASIA OKI 0 1840 0 0
WVU OKI 1 10 1829 0
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1840
Table A.27: Iris confusion matrix when training on 16 images per camera
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1680 0 0 0
CASIA OKI 0 1680 0 0
WVU OKI 15 8 1657 0
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1680
Table A.28: Iris confusion matrix when training on 32 images per camera
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 1359 1 0 0
CASIA OKI 0 1360 0 0
WVU OKI 5 0 1355 0
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 1360
Table A.29: Iris confusion matrix when training on 64 images per camera
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Actual
Classified
ICE LG CASIA OKI WVU OKI WVU EverFocus
ICE LG 720 0 0 0
CASIA OKI 0 720 0 0
WVU OKI 0 4 716 0
WVU EverFocus 0 0 0 720
Table A.30: Iris confusion matrix when training on 128 images per camera
Appendix B
Overview of PKI Cryptography
The following chapter has been borrowed from C. Enrique Ortiz’s article “The Security and
Trust Services API (SATSA) for J2ME: The Security APIs [108]” The article provides an
excellent overview of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) cryptography and the functions which
would be used as a basis for the digital chain of evidence framework described in Chapter 6.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines cryptography as
”the science of mapping readable text, called plaintext, into an unreadable format, called
ciphertext, and vice versa. The mapping process is a sequence of mathematical computations.
The computations affect the appearance of the data, without changing its meaning [108].”
Cryptography has four main goals:
1. Confidentiality or ensuring that only authorized recipients can access information. This
is accomplished by using data encryption.
2. Data integrity or the ability to detect if information has changed. This is accomplished
by using digital signatures.
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3. Non-repudiation or the ability to ensure that a transaction can’t be denied. This is
accomplished by using non-repudiation type of signatures.
4. Authentication or the ability to verify the source of information. This accomplished
by using data encryption and digital signatures.
Cryptography is based on the use of keys for the transformation of plaintext to cipher-
text and back. There are two cryptography models: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric
cryptography uses a single secret key, while asymmetric uses two keys, a private and a public
key pair. Each cryptography model has pros and cons, for example, in the areas of perfor-
mance and key distribution. From the performance perspective, symmetric cryptography is
more efficient (computationally faster) than its asymmetric counterpart, but from the key
distribution perspective (how keys are shared), asymmetric cryptography provides a more
convenient and safer model because the public keys can be shared as needed without fear
of compromising security (since the private key can be kept secret). This is contrary to
symmetric cryptography where special care must be given (secret key must be kept and
distributed secretly) to ensure security is not compromised. Because of these reasons, sym-
metric cryptography is best suited for data encryption, while asymmetric cryptography is
best suited for authentication, non-repudiation and data-integrity through the use of digital
signatures [108].
The left side of Figure B.1 shows the different functional elements within a typical PKI
scheme. The elements include:
1. End-entity - a generic term that describes the end-users consumers of PKI services.
This could be a person, or a computer. To get a digital certificate, end-entities go
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through an enrollment process [108].
2. Certificate Authority (CA) - a trusted 3rd party responsible for the management of
digital certificates. Certificate Authorities are at the center of the PKI trust model. A
CA is responsible for issuing signed digital certificates, for keeping a certificate repos-
itory (2a), and of managing revoked certificates and the associated the Certification
Revocation List (CRL) repository (2b). These repositories typically are LDAP based
[108].
3. Certificate Signing Request (CSR) - a document generated by an end-entity for
certificate enrollment. A CSR contains information about the user such as its distin-
guished name, a public key (signature), and other information. A CSR is encoded using
the Distinguished Encoding Rules for ASN.1 as defined in PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Version. Once the CSR has been verified by a CA, the CA generates
a signed certificate [108].
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Figure B.1: PKI Functional Elements (left) and Public Key Certificate Enrollment Process (Right) [108].
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4. Public Digital Certificate and Certificate Path - a digital certificate, also re-
ferred to as public key certificate, is the public component in PKI. A public certificate
represents the credentials for a given end-entity by binding a specific user to a public
key. The end-entity represented by a certificate holds the private key that corresponds
to that certificate. Certificates are primarily used for digital signatures to verify the
origin (authentication), and integrity of information, and can also be used for non-
repudiation. X.509 Version 3 is the most predominant format for digital certificates.
An X.509 certificate contains all the information about an entity including authenti-
cation/verification information, for example [108]:
• The CA (issuer) serial number.
• A signature algorithm used to sign the certificate.
• The distinguished name of the certificate issuer.
• Validity period for the certificate.
• The subject’s distinguished name - the subject could be the root CA, of inter-
mediate CAs or the end-entity depending on the certificate’s role on a certificate
path; certificate path is explained shortly.
• Subject’s public key.
• The issuer’s unique ID.
• Extension fields for constraints such as key usage restrictions and certificate poli-
cies.
• The certificate’s signature of all the above fields.
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Before a digital certificate can be used, it must first be issued by a trusted Certificate
Authority following what is referred to as a certificate enrollment process. A PKI certificate
enrollment is a multi-step process and can been seen in the right side of B.1. The following
explains the steps in this process [108].
1. A distinguished name is defined. A distinguished name (DN) is a set of attribute
values that uniquely identifies an end-entity (which is stored as an object within a
directory information tree). In the case of PKI and X.509 certificates, a DN is based
on the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of
Distinguished Names (RFC 2253), and is used to identify a certificate’s Subject or
Issuer; the subject is the end-entity who the certificate belongs to, and the issuer is
the CA that issued the certificate.
2. A private key is generated based on a specified algorithm and key-length, and is stored
in a certificate store that resides on a trusted security element, such as a smart-card
or maybe locally on a J2ME device.
3. Once the DN and private key have been defined, a Certificate Signing Request is
generated. The CSR contains information about the user, including the user’s DN,
public key, and other information.
4. The generated CSR is sent for verification to an enrollment computer belonging to a
trusted Certificate Authority, possibly over a secure connection. There are a number
of trusted CAs such as Verisign, Entrust, and Thawte; even institutions such as banks
or large corporations may decide to run their own CA software. The CA you would use
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will depend on your application and customers - for example, for a banking application
the bank institution may already have a relationship with a given set of CAs. Typically
there will be a root certificate already on your handset that corresponds to trusted CAs.
5. Once the CA has validated the CSR, a signed public key X.509 certificate (path) is
returned.
6. The returned X.509 certificate’s chain and/or URI are stored in the local certificate
store.
In network protocols, basic data integrity checks are performed by utilizing checksums
or cyclic-redundancy checks. But these methods are weak when compared to secure crypto-
graphic hash-functions. Also referred to as a digital fingerprint, a message digest is a fixed
length sequence of numbers, a condensed and faithful representation of a message. Generat-
ing a message digest doesn’t alter the message, and any change to the original input message
will result in a different message digest. Verifying data integrity using digests is accom-
plished by simply recalculating the digest then comparing it to the original one. Calculating
a message digest is done using a using a one-way hash function such as RSA Security MD5
or NIST’s SHA-1. This is illustrated in the left side of Figure B.2. There are three high-level
steps to generating a message digest [108]:
1. Initialize the MessageDigest using an algorithm.
2. Calculate (update) the digest from a block of bytes that comprise the signature.
3. Generate the digest.
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Additionally, three things need to be known ahead of time before digests can be generated:
1. The message digest algorithm to use.
2. The input data (byte array) to the hash function.
3. If verifying, the digest to compare to.
1
7
5
Generating and Verifying Message Digests The Digital Signing Process
Figure B.2: Generating and Verifying Message Digests (left) and The Digital Signing Process (right) [108].
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Beyond enforcing data integrity through message digests, digital signatures provide a
mechanism for authentication and non-repudiation, as well as strong data integrity. A digital
signature is a message digest that has been encrypted using a private key. As with message
digests, generating a digital signature doesn.t alter the original message. The result is an
authenticated message with integrity. It is important to note that authentication in this
case is indirect and refers to origin authentication or verification instead of authenticating
a person per-se. In other words, a signed message proves that the message came from a
trusted person, assuming the person has properly safeguarded the private key. As previously
mentioned, digitally signing a message or document is the same as encrypting the document’s
message digest using the signer’s private key. A message signed with a private key can be
verified with the corresponding public key; because public key certificates are shared to
users on a need to know basis, only those end-entities can verify the signature. This process
is show in the right side of Figure B.2. When receiving a signed message or document,
its signature should be verified prior to the message’s consumption. Signature verification
entails decrypting the original message digest that was sent with the message using the
sender’s public key, recalculating the message digest, and then comparing it to the original
message digest. Signature verification requires three high-level steps [108]:
1. Initialize the Signature using a public key and an algorithm.
2. Calculate (update) the signature from a block of bytes that comprise the signature.
3. Verifying (compare) the calculated signature against a specified signature.
Along the same lines, three things need to be known ahead of time before signatures can
be verified [108]:
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1. The public key and algorithm to use to calculate the signature. This information is
typically found in the public key certificate.
2. The algorithm used to generate the original signature. This information is typically
found in the public key certificate.
3. The original message and related signature to verify. This information may be sent
over a network connection, email or in other application-specific channels.
As previously mentioned, symmetric cryptography is best suited for data encryption,
while asymmetric cryptography is best suited for authentication, non-repudiation and data-
integrity through the use of digital signatures. In asymmetric or public key cryptography
public keys are freely distributed as needed. In this model data is encrypted using a public-
key, and is decrypted using the corresponding private-key, and vice-versa. The idea is that
if Alice needs to send a short confidential message to Bob, Alice would encrypt the message
using Bob’s public key. At a later time Bob would use his private key to decrypt the message.
The left side of Figure B.3 shows shows both signing and encryption, which are separate but
related steps, and the results of these steps combined into a single encrypted, signed message.
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Decrypting and Message  and Verifying a Signature
Figure B.3: Encryption (left) and Decryption (right) using PKI [108].
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Decryption simply entails the opposite of data encryption. The right side of Figure B.3
shows this process. Here an encrypted message is decrypted using the recipient’s private key,
and the message digest (digital signature) is decrypted using the sender’s public key, then
verified by comparing the signatures as previously covered. As noted before, PKI cryptog-
raphy is time consuming and relatively inefficient compared to symmetric encryption. Much
simpler and faster than asymmetric encryption, Figure B.4 shows the process of symmetric
encryption suitable for encrypting large amounts of data.
Once again, the framework presented in Chapter 6 uses PKI as a basis for all commu-
nication between entities in a chain of evidence. Additional security mechanisms including
biometric watermarking and digital hardware fingerprinting are used to provide another layer
of security beyond PKI cryptography.
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Figure B.4: Symmetric Cryptography [108].
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